Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq
William Han explores the evolution of the ‘war on terrorism’ in Afghanistan and Iraq and the dilemma of achieving victory on these battlegrounds.
In November 2007, Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense, presented the case for strengthening U.S. soft power and learning to integrate it with hard power, warning that “military success is not sufficient to win”. It was a moment of catharsis: a cleansing after years of failed unilateral foreign and military policies under Donald Rumsfeld. The patriarchal rhetoric about defeating “adversaries at the time, place and in the manner of our choosing” is gone. Similarly, the objectives of eradicating terrorism by “staying on the offensive [and] destroying terrorists” have seen a similar demise. Instead, under Gates, ‘softer’ goals have emerged, of minimising the effects of terrorism by “discrediting extremist ideology, creating fissures between and among extremist groups and reducing them to the level of nuisance groups that can be tracked and handled by law enforcement capabilities”.
Significantly, these changes are the product of a growing self-awareness within the U.S. The ‘superpower’ of our time has finally recognised its financial and military limitations. The financial costs of the ‘war against terrorism’ in Afghanistan and Iraq have been staggering: between 2003 and 2008, the Iraq War cost the U.S. approximately $608.3 billion, while it is estimated that the war in Afghanistan has cost $162.6 billion since 2001. Joseph Stiglitz, the former Chief Economist of the World Bank and winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics, calculated in 2008 that the U.S. will spend in excess of three trillion dollars in Iraq, a figure based on “conservative assumptions” that “probably errs on the low side”.
Naturally, this pressure is not limited to economic resources. The predominant attitude within the military seems to be that the demands of the Iraq War have “stretched the U.S. military dangerously thin”, according to almost 90 per cent of the 3,400 active and retired officers surveyed in 2008. This belief is supported by a classified 2008 Pentagon assessment, which stated that there remains a “significant” risk that the strained U.S. military cannot quickly and fully respond to another conflict elsewhere in the world. Most alarmingly, 44 per cent of the officers expressed agreement with the statement that “the demands of the war in Iraq have broken the U.S. military”. The belief in the efficacy of American military power to mould and control events, to project ‘hard’ power around the world, has been shaken to its core.
The belief in the efficacy of American military power to mould and control events, to project ‘hard’ power around the world, has been shaken to its core.
As illustrated in Iraq and Afghanistan – low intensity, asymmetric wars – the advantages provided by technological and conventional military supremacy mean little if such advantages cannot be adapted rapidly to the environment. By definition, asymmetric warfare is a strategy of last resort: a reaction to the military and economic supremacy of the enemy. The proponents of modern asymmetric warfare attempt to exploit the inherent weaknesses associated with conventional military strength – the inability to respond quickly and with a softer touch – to bleed and drain the enemy. Consequently, a less ‘conventional’ hard power strategy is required: one that blends elements of soft power and ‘smarter’, more flexible, forms of hard power. After years of experiential learning, the strategies of the U.S.-led coalition in the two battlegrounds today show signs of greater initiative, efficiency and effectiveness. Nonetheless, the latest strategies employed by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq carry inherent risks.
The Strategy of Cooperation and Isolation
One of the primary drivers for the success of the ‘surge’ in Iraq has been the cooperation between ‘insurgent’ tribal political and religious leaders with U.S.-coalition forces on the ground. The transformation of the Iraqi province of Anbar, from being the source of the most violent insurgent attacks against U.S. forces in 2007, to being one of the safest in 2009, illustrates the potential multiplier effect of soft power on hard power-focused strategies.
Where the original policy of military unilateralism was based on the assumption that tribes would choose to ‘bandwagon’ onto those with superior hard power, hindsight illustrates that, in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq, ‘mutual’ interest was not created through U.S. military strength. Rather, mutual interest only arose when the tribes began to perceive the ubiquitous and intransigent presence of al-Qaida, and not the coalition forces, as the greater threat to their autonomy. Despite the appearance of U.S. military control, the balance of power was, and remains, with the tribal leaders.
Simultaneously, U.S. military leaders almost completely remodelled their reconstruction and security policy in Anbar around the Sunni tribal sheikhs instead of the central government, recognising that it was the sheiks, and not the general populace, that needed to be swayed. This approach is not without risk. Supporting the independence and capacities of armed, non-state actors inevitably undermines the already low levels of central state authority and legitimacy.
Gradually, as the violence in Iraq lessens in intensity and a veneer of order emerges, ‘cooperation’ will take on another strategic dimension. In March, the Shia-led Iraqi Parliament refused to pass a budget to earmark millions of dollars to pay members of the Sons of Iraq, a paramilitary Sunni group made up of former insurgents. This refusal, combined with the delayed integration of members into the national police and military forces, led some members to openly express regrets about abandoning al-Qaida. The history of sectarian violence in Iraq gives rise to concern that such measures may contribute to a fertile environment of suspicion, ripe for exploitation by al-Qaida and its affiliates.
The Evolution of Hard Power
At the same time, the U.S. is learning to use its forces more innovatively – in line with the objectives of counterinsurgency – in the form of the increasingly important strategic roles played by U.S. Special Forces and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
It is neither soft nor hard power alone that has led to the successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the smarter application of both.
The comparative success of Special Operations forces, as opposed to conventional military forces, in targeting al-Qaida operatives and sectarian militias in Iraq reflects the benefit of faster response times and the ability to operate in remote areas. More significantly, it reflects an improvement in the coordination of intelligence and combat operations. Opening up lines of communication with tribal leaders has given the U.S. and coalition forces access to new streams of information; for example, in the Rusafa district of Baghdad, 11 of 13 al-Qaida targets in the district were captured or killed since November 2008, using intelligence provided by a former insurgent.
Comparatively, the use of UAVs to conduct reconnaissance and engage in ‘precision’ strikes is at the vanguard of ‘casualty-free’ war. Like Special Operations forces, UAVs have become an important ‘precision’ tool in combating the Taliban in remote regions of Afghanistan, which are difficult to access by land. Successes with UAVs in targeting the chief of military operations for al-Qaida, Mohammed Atef, and the Taliban leader, Baitullah Mehsud, have encouraged the U.S. Air Force to train more drone operators than fighter and bomber pilots. Three years ago, the service was able to fly 12 drones simultaneously; today it can fly more than 60.
However, the use of UAVs is not without controversy. Lord Bingham, an eminent international law scholar and judge, has observed: “It may be – I’m not expressing a view – that unmanned drones that fall on a house full of civilians is a weapon the international community should decide should not be used.” If the U.S. is to garner the respect and support of local tribal leaders, then this is precisely the sort of headline that it must avoid creating. Just as too much hard power can be counterproductive, the results of misdirected ‘precision’ hard power are just as damaging as the results of misguided hard power.
‘Smart’ Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq
If the U.S. Department of Defense is correct in its assessment that “small messy wars, fought with messy alliances with messy outcomes” are precedents for future military confrontation, then the U.S. must learn the right lessons.
It is neither soft nor hard power alone that has led to the successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the smarter application of both. Hard power is not a sufficient substitute for soft power and, likewise, soft power cannot replicate the valuable coercion of hard power. The relationship is not necessarily one of incompatibility, although this is distinctly possible, but is potentially mutually reinforcing. For example, it is pointless to talk to or attract al-Qaida using soft power, since U.S. influence lies near the heart of the ‘corruption’ of Islam, which al-Qaida is attempting to remove. In combating the leaders of al-Qaida who cannot be influenced by American values, hard power remains the most logical and immediate deterrent.
The Obama Administration has inherited, and built upon, a delicate balance of hard and soft power strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the rush to disown the Bush Administration’s policy of hard power plus, the Obama Administration must be careful not to cripple U.S. hard power and limit the responsiveness of U.S. power to both conventional and unconventional challenges.
Ultimately, whether or not U.S. or coalition forces remain on the ground, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq will last for another decade, if not longer, based on the precedents of other low-intensity insurgencies over the past century. To avoid passing the conflict onto the next generation, the Obama Administration must be conscious of managing the balance between hard power and soft power strategies, and gravitate towards the ‘smarter’ use of both hard and soft power. Not because it can or because it should, but because it must.
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