The Trials of Anwar Ibrahim
Lisa Cantlon wonders if the Opposition will seize power in Malaysia for the first time since 1957.
In early July, Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia’s main Opposition Leader, was confident that his coalition could form government in the coming months. This would have been momentous in a country ruled by the same coalition, the Barisan Nasional, since its independence in 1957.
However, within days, Anwar was arrested by armed, balaclava-clad police on charges of sodomising an aide.
A decade earlier, Anwar faced sodomy and corruption charges after being ousted as Deputy Prime Minister by the then Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, and after accusing the incumbent Barisan Nasional coalition of corruption. After being beaten during interrogation, Anwar was gaoled for 15 years and banned from politics until 2008. However, he was released in 2004 when the sodomy conviction was overturned.
This time around, the Opposition has even stronger evidence that the charges against Anwar are politically motivated. The Malaysian press has obtained pictures of the aide meeting with the staff of senior government ministers. The charges also coincide with the lapse of the ban on Anwar’s participation in politics.
After being released on bail, Anwar was successful in the August 26 parliamentary by-election in a Penang seat vacated by his wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, who described the charges as “political murder”. Though Anwar missed a self-imposed deadline on September 16 to challenge the Malaysian government, he continues to stress that he has enough support from defecting members of the governing coalition to give the Opposition a majority government. Anwar has called for an emergency session of parliament during the Ramadan recess to seek a no-confidence vote, a call Abdullah seems determined to ignore. Behind this continuing political uncertainty remains the spectre of Anwar’s criminal trial.
“Anwar’s trials are emblematic of Malaysia’s pseudo-democratic political system.”
Anwar’s trials are emblematic of Malaysia’s pseudo-democratic political system. The Malaysian Government is an example of what political scientist William Case describes as a “hybrid regime”. The regime seeks to perpetuate its power by manipulating key institutions and undermining civil liberties while holding regular elections. The Barisan Nasional has, as Case calls it, a “menu of manipulation” from which to choose to legitimate and sustain its position as the single dominant party. Barisan Nasional’s ability to use the police and judiciary for partisan political purposes has been critical in its attempt to discredit the Opposition and retain power.Badawi’s perceived failure to fulfil his 2004 election promise of economic reforms to assist the poor dealt the Barisan Nasional a considerable blow in the March 2008 general election. It was a key reason for significant swings towards the newly formed Opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat. For the first time since 1969, Barisan Nasional failed to retain the two-thirds majority required to make changes to the Constitution.
The Pakatan Rakyat coalition now controls five of the 15 states in Malaysia, up from just one state held by the former opposition coalition in the 2004 election. In this election, the Barisan Nasional won only 85 out of 165 parliamentary seats, slightly more than half of the seats in mainland Malaysia. With systemic malapportionment and gerrymandering in electoral districts, a question to ponder is whether the Barisan Nasional might actually have lost the election without such electoral manipulation.
With the Pakatan Rakyat now in a much stronger political position, it will be even more difficult for the incumbent Barisan Nasional to draw more deeply on the “menu of manipulation” to restrain the grievances of the Malaysian public. Furthermore, the ability of the Barisan Nasional to control the media has been undermined significantly by the growth of Internet media, especially independent online news outlets and the expansion of the blogosphere.
The international reaction to the arrest of Anwar was swift, and condemned the charges. The International Crisis Group attacked the arrest as “obviously politically motivated” and the U.S. State Department voiced “serious questions and concerns”. Of particular concern is whether the Malaysian model of politics is sustainable. How much longer can the BN claim legitimacy of its political stranglehold by holding regular, but not fair, elections?
In recognising that hybrid regimes are more resilient today than hard authoritarianism, Case argues that political change can result from short-term factors that galvanise societal grievances into coherent opposition against the incumbent Government. Transitions to democracy in the Southeast Asian region have also been driven more forcefully by protestors than by voters, such as in the case of the Philippines and Indonesia. Concerted voter opposition will play a central role in determining the likelihood of the Pakatan Rakyat forming government. The decisions of Barisan Nasional MPs on whether to commit to their signalled defection will be critical too.
While Anwar is still a polarising figure in Malaysian politics, it is clear that the Barisan Nasional’s efforts to fragment an Opposition of unprecedented strength are politically perilous. The trials of Anwar also highlight the need for continuing judicial reform. Despite their resilience, Case highlights that hybrid regimes can be changed. The Barisan Nasional is losing its ability to draw more deeply on the “menu of manipulation” on which its fate, and that of Malaysia’s hybrid regime, hangs. And the Opposition voices continue to become louder, signalling a shift in the balance of power over which the Barisan Nasional has little control.
