This article is a response to an article in the last edition of

In his article ‘Torture Under International Law: Setting A Dangerous Precedent’, Matthew Kalyk is correct to point out that the Obama Administration ought to prosecute Bush officials – in a perfect world, that is. It would send a clear indication of America’s commitment to international humanitarian rights law. Unfortunately, however, we do not live in a world of legal perfectibility.

One must consider the consequences of such an action, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the Obama Administration would lose the support of moderate and conservative Americans alike; indeed, loss at the forthcoming general election is likely. With Obama’s popularity already plummeting amid a controversial reform agenda, is it prudent to polarise America even further by commencing prosecutions against Bush officials?

Obama holds the key to returning America to multilateral policies. Never has such a powerful impetus for change swept through America – and, it seems, the world – since his election. An Obama loss in 2012 might well signal a return to American unilateralism and exceptionalism, which were the root causes of the country’s disregard for international humanitarian law in the wake of September 11. This culture of ‘going it alone’ was the true enemy of human rights enforcement, not Bush officials per se.

The solution is by no means elegant or at all completely desirable, and I sympathise completely with the sentiment of the author’s article. But we must be attuned to the long-term consequences of short-term enforcement.

Linton Teoh is in his fifth year of a combined degree in Law and Arts, majoring in Latin and Greek.

This article is a response to an article in the last edition of

Diana Tjoeng’s article, ‘The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Judgment Without Justice?’, touched upon how the highly fractured nature of Cambodian society, with its disparate interests and loyalties, presents serious issues for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in garnering support and legitimacy. Unlike any other international court, the Tribunal must fulfil its role as a national and international judiciary. Compromise on procedural issues will invariably be necessary, and may come at the cost of justice.

Cambodian society is highly fractured, in both its past and present political contexts. Some Cambodians support the Tribunal, in the belief that their future lies with the ruling Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP). This group also deeply distrusts the international community for allowing the Khmer Rouge to hold a seat at the UN for 10 years.

Others are opposed to the government. They believe that national problems such as corruption are linked directly to the CPP and that the trials are only a mechanism for repairing damaged political reputations. Resultantly, this group calls for greater international intervention in the court to ensure transparency.

The CPP and the UN, both of whom have indirectly supported the Khmer Rouge in the past, must find a solution and develop a process that appeases each of these disparate parties for the Tribunal to be legitimate. The deep distrust of the CPP by some, and of the international community by others, has led many to question the legitimacy and effectiveness of the hybrid Tribunal. Whether the Tribunal has allowed for adequate representation of the interests of the disparate parties remains a pressing concern, as does the degree of compromise that may be needed between various political and judicial interests for obtaining justice, and the securing of support for the Tribunal’s legitimacy. The roots run much deeper than corruption.

Mark Grime is in his fourth year of a combined degree in Law and Economic and Social Sciences, majoring in Government and International Relations.

In their respective articles, Anshu De Silva Wijeyeratne, Kate Sullivan, and Elizabeth Watt address the efficacy of Asian democracies. Although cultural homogenisation has occurred across the globe, nations retain distinct cultural characteristics that will continue to form the bedrock of their particular societies. National systems of governance are subject to contextually relevant social phenomena that neither enhance nor diminish the value of any of their possible democratic models, of which the Western liberal model is only one.

Accordingly, ‘Asian democracy’ is a valid system of representative government in the context of Asia’s particular priorities and cultural values. Chan Heng Chee observes a number of characteristics unique to Asian democracies. This includes a greater acceptance of, and respect for, authority and hierarchy, and a tendency for states to be strong and interventionist, with a centralised bureaucracy.

On this basis, it can be argued that Asian democratic models are, perhaps, adequate in the cultural and social circumstances unique to the region. Indonesia is a prime example of Western democratic concepts failing because of their unsuitability in a particular socio-cultural situation, with improvements in Indonesia’s ‘democratic rating’ being measured by inapplicable Western indicia. As such, it may be the imposition of Western values on Asian institutions that is flawed, rather than the concept of Asian democracy itself.

Mark Grime is in his fourth year of a combined degree in Law and Economic and Social Sciences, majoring in Government and International Relations.

The nexus between democracy and the solution to the crisis in Myanmar is hardly as obvious as Anshu De Silva Wijeyeratne seems to suggest in the November 2008 edition of The Sydney Globalist. Indeed, in examining the crisis in terms of “ASEAN’s credibility in dealing with the challenge of democratising Myanmar”, his analysis makes two highly questionable assumptions.

The first concerns the relationship between democracy and the protection of human rights. Liberal democracy has (what Michael Mann has called) a ‘dark side’ inseparable from the history of class warfare and genocide in the West. Mann’s analysis suggests that not only is democracy firmly rooted within a social, cultural and historical framework that normalises relations between the various power centres within a nation-state, but also that democracy as a political framework is as complex as any other political system. In prematurely dismissing ‘Asian values’ as an explanation for ASEAN’s apathy, Wijeyeratne implies that the highly contextual values and cultural norms of democracy are easily transferred. There is a danger in placing too much faith in the universality of democratic norms, especially where they are detached from the cultural context that provides them with meaning and substance.

Regardless, the implication that democracy provides some sort of solution (or part of the solution) to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar presumes that democratic institutions are inherently fairer, more efficient, and capable of addressing the problem. This is clearly not the case, as Kate Sullivan suggested in her article on democracy in China. A critique that addresses the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar within a rigid framework, which presumes that democracy is an essential part of the solution, risks imposing a solution that is unviable and ultimately counter-productive.

Sue Soueid is in her fourth year of a combined degree in Law and Arts, majoring in Government and International Relations.

In ‘Antiquated Ideologies and the Next Ten Words’, Edward Cohen and David Howell provide a compelling critique of Robert Kagan’s proposal for a ‘league of democracies’. Kagan’s suggestion – that liberal democratic states should band together to contain rising autocratic regimes – is misguided. To arrange global security alliances along these lines risks igniting an ideological battle reminiscent of the Cold War.

But is the idea of a ‘league of democracies’ entirely without merit? Such a league might be useful; not as a security arrangement, but as an association confined to the very subject matter on which its membership would be conditioned: democratic governance. The league could be a watchdog for democracy, serving as a leaders’ forum for discussing issues of representative government and the rule of law. It could cut across traditional north-south, east-west divides, bringing together democracies from Canada to Cape Verde.

Of course, the proposal is not without risk. The league might descend into shameless self-congratulation. Its commentary could be heavily politicised. Many developing states might be reluctant to join at all, preferring to maintain the regional alliances that currently see robust democracies such as Senegal siding with the likes of Zimbabwe. Finally, as Cohen and Howell point out, determining which states qualify as ‘democracies’ would be no simple task.

Nonetheless, the concept of a league of democracies is not invalid in itself. And like the voter who dutifully goes to the polls knowing that her vote will be statistically insignificant, this writer cannot help but have a little faith in the power of democratic ideals.

Christine Ernst is in her fifth year of a combined degree in Law and Economic and Social Sciences, majoring in Government and International Relations.

EU membership ... leverage against aspiring members.

In her article ‘Recognising Kosovo’, Zilka Grogan assessed the implications of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008. Since her article went to print, the list of states that have formally recognised Kosovo has lengthened from nine to 45, though it still lacks several heavyweights, such as India, China, and Russia. As Grogan predicted, states with internal secessionist movements, including Spain and Romania, have continued to refuse recognition.

Grogan rightly drew attention to the knife-edge position in which Kosovo’s declaration placed Serbia, expressing concern that Serbia may “shy away from support for Europe until it withdraws support for Kosovo’s independence”. The country’s powerful nationalist political bloc vehemently opposes Kosovar independence. Likewise, Boris Tadić’s pro-Western coalition, which formed a new government in May this year, refuses to recognise Kosovo.

“Serbia’s behaviour this year has illustrated the value of EU membership – with its concomitant economic and political benefits – as leverage against aspiring members.”

Nevertheless, as Grogan correctly anticipated, the new liberal government has ranked EU membership as a higher priority than Kosovo’s reincorporation. In July, Serbian security agents arrested former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, who has been on the run for 13 years and whom the UN War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has indicted twice. The government is continuing reform programs that are conditions of EU accession, including combating corruption and strengthening the judiciary. Moreover, although Mr Tadić decries Kosovo’s declaration as illegal, he has committed his government to using diplomatic channels to voice dissent, rather than resorting to force.

Serbia’s behaviour this year has illustrated the value of EU membership – with its concomitant economic and political benefits – as leverage against aspiring members. Despite Serbian leaders’ fierce rhetoric condemning Kosovo’s independence, the fact that many EU states have recognised the fledgling state has not, as Grogan feared, imperilled Serbia’s path to accession.

Naomi Hart is in her fourth year of a combined degree in Arts and Law. She is currently undertaking Honours in Modern History.

Lily Morrissey’s article ‘Identity Crisis’ explains how the success of microfinance is being eroded by the ‘self-sufficiency’ versus ‘welfare’ debate of microfinance initiatives (MFIs). While this topic is interesting from a normative perspective, it ignores a much larger question: are MFIs actually successful?

“Before we discuss whether MFIs should be focused on self-sufficiency or welfare, we need to break down the overly optimistic assumptions about the benefits of microfinance.”

Morrissey rightly points out how poorly ‘self-sufficiency’ is defined by MFIs and analysts, yet she fails to explain how welfare models are judged in terms of success (excluding economic criteria). While MFIs may include social targets as their primary focus, the impact of such programs on these aspects is hardly monitored. Furthermore, when it is, the results are bleak. Welfare advocates argue that the targeting of women in MFIs empowers them. However, attempts to evaluate these assertions have found that empowerment comes at a cost. In a number of studies, domestic violence appears to have increased among female borrowers, including those of the Grameen Bank. In addition, MFI intervention has also been weakly linked to increased suicide rates among women and men.

The welfare argument cannot explain these discrepancies. As such, before we discuss whether MFIs should be focused on self-sufficiency or welfare, we need to break down the overly optimistic assumptions about the benefits of microfinance.

Keira Glasgow is in her fifth year of an International Studies degree. She is currently undertaking Honours in Government and International Relations.

In ‘The Two Faces of Migrant Labour’, Patrick Wall identifies that migrant labour programmes would be more effective if they were regulated by governmental bodies – such as immigration departments – that monitor the legal channels of migrant entry and formal work arrangements.

However, effective migrant programs require more than just government oversight; recognition of the nature of labour migration and the actors involved in representing workers’ rights are essential.

“Effective migrant programs require more than just government oversight; recognition of the nature of labour migration and the actors involved in representing workers’ rights are essential.”

Firstly, as Temporary Labour Migrants (TLMs) are not from the host country, there is little incentive for the host government to act on behalf of foreign citizens. As nationalistic campaigns are what capture domestic constituencies, it is of little interest to host governments to do much about the issue.

Secondly, TLMs often don’t have the same protection rights as ‘normal’ workers. For example, in Southeast Asia – the world’s largest migrant exporter – labour migration is mainly informal; migrants work and travel outside the legal boundaries of host countries or stay longer than their visas permit. Similarly, as most TLMs are women, their work is considered normal unpaid female domestic labour, like cleaning. Consequently, TLMs are not recognised as normal citizens and do not have the same rights as workers in the host country.

As governments – like the Malaysian government – and labour unions have little interest in TLM advocacy, labour NGOs are the key players in representing the needs of their transnational constituents and therefore their role needs to be assessed.

By investigating their key role, we can consider alternative forms of organising – a subject that lies outside traditional labour migrant studies.

Ben Davis recently graduated from an Arts degree (First Class Honours), majoring in Indonesian Studies.