Opium Dreams
Anna Solar-Bassett analyses the corrupt reality of the ‘promise’ of poppy crops in Afghanistan’s poverty-stricken south.
Barack Obama came to power with an overriding foreign policy goal: to move the focus of America’s war in the Middle East from Iraq to Afghanistan. The removal of Iraqi forces was swift: 17,000 additional troops were pledged to Afghanistan. An increase of more than 300 per cent in U.S. aid to Afghanistan has also been requested for the next budget. The atmosphere is distinctly anxious. So why the panic?
Quite simply, this is an effort at stabilising what Richard Holbrooke, Obama’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, calls “the most dangerous region in the world”. 93 per cent of the world’s opium originates from Afghanistan. In 2004, 36 per cent of the Afghan GDP came from opium, rising to 53 per cent in 2008, according to the UN. Hamid Karzai, the first democratically elected Afghan president, took office in 2002 with the hopes of the world behind him, only to become known as a staggeringly corrupt leader who encouraged opium money trafficking and laundering throughout the military, judicial and bureaucratic sectors.
Worryingly, the World Bank Institute rates Afghanistan as the second- or third-most corrupt country in the world, due mainly to the slush funds created by opium trafficking.
Although only half of the 364 local districts harbour opium, public expectation of corruption within these regions sits between 83-100 per cent. The real figure of corruption in these regions is estimated by the UN to be 50 per cent. According to a 2006 investigation by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, the country’s justice and security sectors, arguably the two most important sectors in combating corruption, are blighted by a 41 per cent and 20 per cent corruption rate, respectively.
The Extent is Far-Reaching
The overwhelming majority of opium is produced in Helmand, a southern region of primarily Pashto nationality. It accounts for up to half (2,000 metric tons) of Afghanistan’s total opium production. President Karzai himself is from this region and background. He therefore relies on many of the votes from this area, as well as funding from opium producers, to lobby and affect bureaucratic implementation of policy. Most concerning is that the Taliban bases its stronghold in Helmand, recruiting for, and diverting funds to, al-Qaida insurgents based across the border in Pakistan.
Whilst the macro-economic effects of the opium trade evidence the drug’s boon for the Afghan nation, the micro-economic reality is that most drug profits end up in the hands of insurgents or global businesspeople.
Thus, the increased centralisation of opium money is not only deepening long-term political corruption; it is also moving the vast bulk of ‘poppy dollars’ outside the reach of ordinary Afghans, and into the hands of al-Qaida. Indeed, reports authored concurrently by the World Bank, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the UN Human Development body, note that whilst the macro-economic effects of the opium trade evidence the drug’s boon for the Afghan nation, the micro-economic reality is that most drug profits end up in the hands of insurgents or global businesspeople.
Solutions in Sight?
Former President George W. Bush’s opium policy centred on reducing crops through spraying and/or the direct cutting-down of fields. The ineffectiveness of these simplistic solutions was underscored by debates about whether or not to recompense farmers who lost their livelihoods. These subsidies brought further corruption, as farmers sought to regrow crops in repayment of their losses. Those not recompensed have become likely Taliban recruits. Furthermore, the replacement crop (wheat) was unsustainable, and the after-effects of spraying were similar to those of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War.
Viable alternative strategies have not materialised. The Obama Administration is tackling the problem at the factory and manufacturing levels, with limited success as more factories emerge. Foreign direct investment in overseas business is unlikely to offer an alternative means of employment until Afghanistan’s negligible infrastructure is comprehensively addressed by foreign aid. It has been suggested that finding alternative crops may be the best solution. At a recent university research symposium, it was suggested that certain fruits and vegetables might be more amendable to Afghan conditions, and less likely to suffer from the mould issues for which wheat was renowned.
The Obama Administration has most certainly given a new direction to Afghanistan policy. A strong rally of troops, combined with increased aid, has kindled a renewed sense of purpose and strength for combating what are now clearly defined policy goals. However, a united U.S. front may decline as the troop count increases.
Indeed, Obama and Karzai have admitted that opium is likely to be around for another five to 10 years. Considering the fact that troop casualties are expected to increase this year as counterinsurgency strategies continue, Karzai and Obama’s admission that international troops are likely to remain in Afghanistan for another 15-20 years will be poorly received by many. The interconnected problems of drugs and domestic corruption are ones that foreign governments with troops in Afghanistan must not only address, but be seen to be addressing.
Obama and his subordinates would do well to remember McNamara’s statement that “in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions”.
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