What is the Future of Liberal Democracy?
Wesley Lalich considers the future of an enduring system of governance.
Over the past decade, the global landscape has fundamentally changed, with nascent indicators of an end to Western hegemony appearing in tangible and sustainable forms. Whilst it has become modish to discuss China’s rise, it seems evident that even if the Middle Kingdom does not eclipse America, the combined weight of the emerging Asian nations, impressive growth in parts of South America and Africa, and a resurgent Russia all signal the relative decline of Western economic pre-eminence. Western countries undoubtedly enjoyed a half-millennium of exploring, exploiting and subjugating much of the globe, siring new societies in the Americas and Australia, and finally concluding in the last half-century that self-determination should apply beyond Europe. As the transition from a North Atlantic-centred global order to an Asia-Pacific-oriented world occurs, the lasting impact of Western economic and political ideology on emerging nations is unclear.
Whilst the current global recession has accelerated the splintering of the Washington Consensus, all Western societies would still consider a generally market-oriented economy and a liberal democracy to be the two basic pillars necessary for a successful state. China has been the most successful emerging economy and has achieved this without embracing these prescriptions. China has not democratised; and while it has embraced market economics, it has not broadly liberalised its economy or opened up to foreign competition, as advocated by the neo-classical economics of the Washington Consensus. This raises two points. First, as China engages more vigorously in the developing world, by pursuing natural resources and offering aid, will an alternative authoritarian development model supplant existing models that emphasise democracy? Second, is this even a cause for concern, or is liberal democracy likely to take hold in economically advanced societies, regardless of the model of development used?
The two key elements that have dominated the Western approach to development over the last 30 years are economic liberalisation and democracy-building. However, China, the leading emerging economy of this period, has not followed this path. China may have abandoned communism and injected capitalism into its economy, but the state still exercises broad economic control, and foreign ownership in domestic industries is usually limited to partnerships with Chinese firms. In fact, most Asian success stories of the post-war period, including South Korea and Taiwan, combined authoritarian rule with the protection of domestic industries and export-led growth. Until very recently, many developing countries had no choice but to adhere to Western development plans, or else monetary aid would not be forthcoming. China’s spectacular economic success, vast foreign currency reserves, and increasingly comfortable role as an emerging superpower have meant that it has not shied away from engaging in the developing world, particularly to secure access to natural resources. The numbers are telling. In 2003, China invested $300 million in African development. In 2007, the figure was nearly $3 billion.
Unlike assistance provided by Western governments and global institutions, China’s aid does not come with covenants on reducing corruption or respecting human rights. In recent years, there have been numerous examples of this. Recently, Nigeria – a major oil nation – decided to opt for untied Chinese aid to rebuild its rail network, instead of a World Bank loan that also involved tackling the corruption that cripples its rail system. Similar events transpired in Angola with the IMF, where hours before an aid agreement that included a transparency commitment was to be signed, the IMF was told that the Angolan Government was no longer interested in IMF finance, as China had offered a more attractive soft loan. China has also been extending foreign aid to its impoverished neighbours, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Mynamar, and was not timid about investing heavily in Sri Lanka to secure port facilities during the final stages of a recent conflict there, during which the Sri Lankan Government was accused of war crimes.
The more concerning aspect of the economic rise of an authoritarian country like China is not that it will obliterate democracy, but that it will alter current interpretations of the concept.
As China transforms into an economic superpower, its capacity to foster alternative avenues of development that de-emphasise democracy-building will become more pervasive and persuasive. First, it is worth remembering that, despite the success of liberal democracy in the last few decades – including the fall of communism, the cementation of democracy in Spain, Portugal and South America, and the democratisation of Taiwan and South Korea – its ascendancy is a relevantly recent occurrence. In the 1930s, as fascism was goose-stepping across Europe and the militaristic Japanese sun was blinding Asia with its might, the possibility of a future without a prevalence of democracy was real. Even at points in the Cold War, such as the launching of Sputnik by the Soviet Union and the perception that America was falling behind in the space race, it appeared that a communist dictatorship offered a viable alternate economic and political order. Thus, the current supremacy that rich-world democratic powers enjoy does not mean that it is the natural order of government for economically satiated nations. If China continues on its politically repressive path, while managing robust economic growth, the ability of Western countries to encourage other developing countries to embrace democracy and respect human rights will be diminished. Not only will the example of China reduce the assertion that democracy and transparency are essential ingredients for economic success, but Chinese aid could provide a ready substitute where international agencies and Western governments insist on attaching conditions to financial assistance.
The more concerning aspect of the economic rise of an authoritarian country like China is not that it will obliterate democracy, but that it will alter current interpretations of the concept. Civil and political rights have long been understood in the context of pluralistic liberal democracies, as the standards that have been set by the rich world. Although China is a one-party state, it has vibrant intellectual circles, policy centres, and think tanks, where the future of China is debated. These debates are part of the political process. Whilst there is no widespread agitation for free elections in China, unlike during the lead-up to the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Government is fairly responsive to the public will. For example, there has been a greater emphasis on developing a social safety net. This deliberative authoritarian model serves to prevent public dissatisfaction and create a degree of legitimacy, while circumventing civil and political rights. It is unlikely, but not beyond the pale, that in the coming years the rights narrative offered by prosperous authoritarian regimes dominates international discourse.
This brings us to the second question: whether, in the long term, any of this really matters. An economically thriving and market-oriented totalitarian state has not been tested for longevity since the fall of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and whether they would have remained tyrannical even if the Allied forces had not forcibly democratised them is an historical hypothetical. It seems counter-intuitive to suggest that a society that becomes accustomed to consumer choice in all avenues of life would be content with an authoritarian and repressive political sphere. The Chinese, and even Russian, publics’ complacency towards autocratic government is understandable considering the tumult of the Mao years and the sour association many Russians have with the politically free, but thoroughly chaotic, Yeltsin era. Much as Hitler provided stability and economic opportunity to the German people in the aftermath of the liberal and turbulent Weimar Republic, order and positive economic prospects in China and Russia could easily be weightier human considerations than concerns of free speech and freedom of association. If recent trends continue, and stability and economic success become the norm, it is unclear whether the citizens of authoritarian countries will remain content with their present political order.
Democracy will eventually prevail if one essential condition is met: that an authoritarian regime values economic growth above totalitarianism.
Democracy will eventually prevail if one essential condition is met: that an authoritarian regime values economic growth above totalitarianism. A regime that is adamant on remaining in power, such as the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, can do so by ruining the economy and strangling civil society. However, if a dynamic and growing economy is the pre-eminent consideration of a government, then an incremental erosion of totalitarian control would appear likely. Investment and technological innovation require a stable domestic environment, meaning that overt and violent political repression, capricious behaviour, and a lack of respect for such fundamentals as the rule of law are likely to inhibit economic growth.
Two examples lend credence to the notion that industrialised societies such as China will not remain totalitarian. South Korea and Taiwan were both ruled by right-leaning military dictatorships in the years following their respective civil wars. They nonetheless experienced exceptional export-led economic growth through the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, as both were on the cusp of becoming high-income countries, civil society started to become more restless and vocal in its opposition, and there was a relatively peaceful and internally driven transition to democratic governance.
Two examples are hardly conclusive, and this has not been the case elsewhere; for instance, Singapore, which has grown wealthy, remains somewhat authoritarian. But to liberals and democrats who believe in a basic human inclination towards freedom and human rights, and the power of such ideals, it is not fantastical to suppose that a society could gravitate towards a system of governance that guarantees liberty. Liberal democracy has, in different eras, evolved gradually, violently, fitfully and occasionally peacefully, and whilst it requires vigilance to remain robust, it will thrive so long as it is not brutally suppressed. The global order is changing, with power gradually shifting away from the developed democracies. However, this by no means dims the future prospects of liberal democracy.
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