China’s About-Face
Sophia Chen, Daniel Liu and Richard Liu look at the changing face of China’s foreign relations, military, and political transparency.
In August 2009, the 2.3 million-member People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China began a public relations campaign aimed at increasing the transparency of the world’s largest standing military. The PLA consists of the army, navy and air force, which are all under the direct control of the Chinese Communist Party. The start of this campaign coincided with the conclusion of bilateral talks between China and the United States. Is this campaign indicative of real change in Chinese foreign policy?
A New Public Face
The media blitz comes at a low point in the PLA’s public relations. From the Tiananmen Square massacres to the recent unrest in Xinjiang, the PLA has gained a reputation as the Communist Party’s heavy hand of subjugation. In March 2009, the PLA officer of the Secondary Artillery Corps stated: “Our Military has always had a bad reputation, here and abroad. The outside world does not see our perspective. If they do, they will understand the actions China has taken.”
The Chinese Ministry of Defence made its debut on the internet in August 2009, when it promised to present “a better perception of China’s national defence policy and display before the world the fine image of the PLA as a mighty, civilized and peaceful force”. This announcement coincided with the launch of China’s Naval Officer exchange program with Japan, South Korea and Germany.
Is this an attempt by China to evade its history of brutality and oppression? Or is this indicative of real change within the Chinese military and political establishment? The answer remains unclear.
As China becomes increasingly engaged with the global community and the international economy, their interests also become increasingly aligned.
On the one hand, there are indications that China is actively engaging in collective security. It has a small but constant peacekeeping and nation-building presence in Africa, and the PLA Navy has joined in international efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia. China’s new peacekeeping role within the international community marks a turn-around from its history of brutality and oppression. On the other hand, China has concrete, strategic interests in Asia’s sea-lanes, as well as a major commitment to its own military strength. Chinese naval expansion and force projection in the Pacific will continue to fuel insecurity among China’s neighbours unless, and until, it is addressed through dialogue, rather than oppression.
Economic Liberalisation
Proponents of economic liberalisation theory point to the history of Chinese economic liberalisation as the catalyst for broad, substantive change within Chinese society, and more specifically within the military. As China becomes increasingly engaged with the global community and the international economy, their interests also become increasingly aligned. Moreover, China is more frequently expected to meet Western democratic standards of political accountability and economic transparency.
Prior to 1978, under Mao Zedong’s foreign policy of ‘self-reliance’, China was an enclosed nation that lacked economic and social transparency. Since the reforms by Deng Xiaoping, the country has become more liberalised, allowing for both direct and indirect foreign investment. China has become an integral member of the global community and has been a driving force behind the economic growth during the boom years. Economic transparency was a major theme in the recent bilateral discussions.
However, in the realm of foreign relations and governance, transparency is still a major issue. The latest U.S. Congress report on Chinese foreign policy admitted that the “study of China’s international influence is hampered by a lack of reliable data”. Much of the international community continues to criticise the lack of oversight of aid by government agencies to African countries, including international pariahs such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.
However, any discussion on transparency in China cannot exclude reference to the recent issues in Xinjiang.
China argues that it has shifted towards greater transparency, with extensive live state-media coverage of the unrest in Xinjiang provided to its citizens in China and around the world. This is an unprecedented move considering the country’s history of censorship, and a clear step towards freedom of press.
Yet the West is still critical of Chinese media’s selective reporting. Yaling Zhao, a media student from Peking University, argues that the media’s objective is not merely to convey the news, for it “also has the responsibility of inducing social stability”. The Western media, he argues, blow the facts out of proportion. Zhao poses the question: “Is showing decapitated heads, the most devastating pictures, and portraying an event in the most exaggerated way good for anyone?”
China will need to uphold the rule of law and due process to win back the respect of the international community.
The challenge for China’s public image now is to present transparent and just court proceedings for all 718 people detained since the outbreak of violence in Xinjiang on 5 July. China will need to uphold the rule of law and due process to win back the respect of the international community.
Strong Arm Diplomacy
The latest events in Sino-Australian relations present serious challenges for China.
The new image of might was projected clearly by the Chinese Government in the recent Rio Tinto incident, where the failed investment bid by the state-owned Chinalco led to the arrest of four Rio Tinto employees in China. Arguably, China is re-embracing hard power against the backdrop of a savvy age of soft power.
However, there is more to the Rio Tinto iron ore lawsuit than what appears to be a criminal prosecution undertaken in the hard-line Chinese totalitarian way. Western countries criticised China’s treatment of Stern Hu and his three Rio Tinto colleagues, who were held for more than four weeks without charge. It should be noted, though, that the politics behind this situation were complex.
If one thing is clear, it is that China seeks to develop its economy above all other considerations. Where the matter is one of economic interest, China flexes its muscles, straining relationships with its traditional trading partners (including Australia). Many have cited this incident as evidence of China making an example of Australia in order to project a tougher diplomatic face when it comes to economics.
Recent clinks between China and Australia began when Chinalco increased its share in the world-class minerals assets of Rio Tinto in a $25 billion deal. Beijing was displeased with the political wariness with which it was greeted by the Australian Government. Although the Australian Government did not block the deal, it did impose conditions on smaller takeovers of other resource assets by Chinese state-owned companies. The political atmosphere was tense and Rio Tinto was not the only party that sensed it. But leaving the bargaining table certainly ended the affair on a much worse note. Is it surprising that Chinese leaders decided to make this rebuff an opportunity to teach a lesson to Rio Tinto, Australia and anyone else watching?
After all, the Gorgon gas deal – in which PetroChina agreed to buy $50 billion worth of liquefied natural gas from ExxonMobil – was struck less than a week after charges of commercial espionage and bribery were laid against Stern Hu. With such a large buying power, China can afford to blow political and diplomatic capital with Australia to make noise during the Melbourne Film Festival and the visit to Australia by Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer.
Although the future of this rising superpower in the Asia Pacific remains uncertain, it is clear that China has a growing economic presence. The new face of China is none too soft and adaptable. The economy is at the heart of Chinese interests, yet the challenge the country’s Government needs to overcome is to project a more mature and pragmatic diplomatic face on the international plane.
