The Afghan Surge
Tim Mooney asks whether the strategy of the ‘troop surge’ used in Iraq will also be effective in Afghanistan.
In November 2006, President Bush and his Republican Party suffered a heavy defeat in the mid-term elections. In victory, Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi said that “this election is about Iraq” and that the American people had “rejected the course of action the President is on”. The voters seemed to agree. As Democrats were swept to power, 75 per cent of Americans believed that the government would swiftly withdraw troops.
By 2007, in the wake of this defeat, the last thing anyone expected was a greater commitment to the war. But this was exactly what the President delivered, announcing, in a televised speech on January 10, a ‘surge’ in troops to stabilise Iraq. The new policy also involved giving greater freedom for Iraqis to fight for themselves, and making peace with some insurgent groups. A Fox News poll showed that 59 per cent of Americans were against the surge.
By mid-2008, it was becoming obvious that the dire predictions for the surge were misplaced. Iraqi civilian deaths were down significantly, bombings were less frequent, and fewer areas were outside of the control of American, British, or Iraqi forces. Sectarian groups that had previously fought the occupation were now armed with American weapons, waging war against al-Qaida in Iraq.
The success of the surge was reflected in a shift in public opinion. The most visible beneficiary of this change was John McCain, who used his ‘No Surrender’ bus tour of New Hampshire to focus on his early support for the surge, and his confidence in an eventual victory in Iraq. His 37 per cent to 32 per cent victory over the previously favoured Mitt Romney seemed to vindicate his approach. By February 2008, a CNN poll showed that 52 per cent of Americans believed that U.S. forces were making progress in Iraq.
Opponents of the surge quietly dropped their previous views. John McCain pushed Barack Obama to recant his earlier opposition to the surge. The answer for Obama was essentially to ignore the surge in Iraq, and co-opt the idea to strengthen his stance on Afghanistan. Obama argued that troops should be moved from Iraq, for a new ‘surge’ in Afghanistan. With a resurgent Taliban destabilising neighbouring Pakistan, and increased heroin production, Obama argued that Afghanistan should be the ‘central front’ in the war on terror.
This analogy, once a piece of campaign rhetoric, is being carried through. The commander who managed the surge in Iraq, General David Petraeus, is now in charge of the war in Afghanistan. The United States continues to increase troop numbers in Afghanistan, and has asked NATO countries and other allies, including Australia, for more troops. There are serious questions about whether the strategy that worked in Iraq can also work in Afghanistan, both operationally and in convincing the public that the war is worthwhile.
Winning a different war
The surge in Iraq was successful not only because it applied more force to winning the war, but because it totally redefined what winning would look like. The U.S. military explicitly abandoned a quick transition to democracy, instead focusing on the protection of civilians. In doing so, it made peace with many former insurgents. One U.S. officer even managed to broker a peace deal with an insurgent after the two discovered a common love for the film Titanic over tea.
Replicating this strategy raises serious questions. Are we prepared to deal with Afghan warlords in the way in which we dealt with sectarian leaders in Iraq? There are some important differences that raise questions about the wisdom of this strategy.
Firstly, it is unclear that warlords have the intentions or the character to be trusted with control over large parts of Afghanistan. Iraqi sectarian leaders were popular rulers, in some cases representing an upsurge of public feeling against American occupation. In contrast, Afghan warlords are largely representative of tribal identities, ancient hierarchies, or the most recent leadership of criminal gangs. Forging alliances with the warlords would be acceding to the most powerful, not recognising real public support. The moral grounds for ceding authority are much murkier in Afghanistan than they were in Iraq. Even where leaders represent ethnicities, the huge diversity of ethnic groups in Afghanistan means that they are likely to be controlling members of other ethnic groups in their respective regions.
The religious extremist groups in Afghanistan are of an extremely different character. Afghanistan has a much stronger fundamentalist tradition than Iraq, and Iraq has had a relatively secular recent history. The oppression of women, summary justice, and religious intolerance are all practiced by many of those we might regard as prospective allies.
In Iraq, the United States has done business with many quasi-religious insurgent leaders. This might perhaps be viewed as a precedent for dealing with religious leaders in Afghanistan who might be pried away from the Taliban’s influence. In Iraq, however, it was very clear that there were limits to the application of Islamic fundamentalist law, even for insurgent groups. The turn of Shiites against al-Qaida was, in part, a reaction to its attempts to impose strict religious doctrines in the areas in which it operated.
Even if we set aside the unpalatability of those who might be turned against the Taliban and al-Qaida, there are reasons to believe that they are also untrustworthy. For local warlords, it might be easy enough to turn against the Taliban or terrorists and use American weapons and funding to fight them. Once the Taliban is dislodged, however, they will be left to fight with any number of other local warlords. Given both historical tribal conflicts, and the current opportunities for economic exploitation, this is likely to happen.
But such considerations of the character of our prospective allies, and their trustworthiness, may be luxuries we can ill afford. The government in Kabul shows few progressive or democratic instincts, and almost no ability to exert control outside of Kabul. Hamid Karzai might be regarded as merely the most powerful tribal leader in the nation, rather than a real executive. The parliament recently voted in support of the notion that women were duty-bound to do as their husbands pleased. To expect any Afghan leader to support western ideals may be unrealistic.
The relative weakness of the Coalition’s position in Afghanistan may also impose the need to ignore the failings of those who could provide help to the occupying forces. In Iraq, the surge allowed the United States to send 20,000 extra troops, but in fact placed several hundred thousand people under arms to oppose their enemies. With public opinion so sceptical about the continuing war, it would be impossible to send such an enormous number of troops to Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s territory is twice as large as Iraq, and far more geographically difficult. An American force of around 60,000, or even 80,000, cannot be expected to control thousands of valleys and mountains, especially in conditions that oscillate between scorching heat and sub-zero cold.
Selling the war
The surge in Iraq came as time was running out for the war. President Bush knew that a new president, probably a Democrat, would most likely begin withdrawing troops. The surge was crafted to have an immediate impact, because time was running out politically as well as militarily.
The war in Afghanistan may be at a similar crossroads. Opposition to the war has been rising steadily in the United States. A CNN poll at the beginning of April showed that 53 per cent of Americans are now opposed to the war in Afghanistan. Support is shaky in other allied countries. A March poll showed that 51 per cent of Australians oppose continued involvement in the war. Despite opposing the war, 68 per cent of Americans in the same CNN poll were in favour of a surge in troop numbers.
The contradictory views of Americans suggest that they are prepared to give the surge a chance. The first reason for this must be that Americans have seen the success of the troop surge in Iraq, and trust both the strategy and its architect, General David Petraeus.
The second reason for Americans to support the surge is the popularity of Barack Obama. Nearly four months into his administration, he continues to enjoy a 63 per cent approval rating. The idea of a surge in Afghanistan benefits from his personal popularity.
Neither of these factors will continue. A policy in Afghanistan that fails to produce results will convince the American people that the war is unwinnable. Having experienced years of stalemate in Iraq, any setbacks at all are likely to erode public confidence. 52 per cent of Americans say that they would oppose any increase in troop numbers beyond the 20,000 proposed for the surge.
Change in Afghanistan must be achieved soon, because Americans will not stand for war coninuing for much longer. A decisive move like the surge seems to be the only means possible to achieve any success in Afghanistan.
Lowering expectations
The surge is the answer to a situation to which no happy endings are available. Afghanistan will not be a democracy, and most likely will also not be particularly stable. The surge, however, represents the best possible hope for some sort of a settlement in Afghanistan. This would involve the expulsion of the Taliban, more control for the government, and a decrease in drug production.
The United States invaded Afghanistan knowing that it had defeated several of the most powerful empires in history. Now, it must swallow its pride and deal with those who can help it to bring stability, if not democracy. A surge in Afghanistan will make for unpleasant moral choices, and a very imperfect settlement, but it may be the best option available.
