Nuclear Proliferation: Crisis, Destiny, or an Excuse for Using Force?
Flora Ho explores the different narratives of crisis associated with nuclear proliferation.
As North Korea pre-emptively launched its three-stage rocket on April 5, 2009, and subsequently ordered the departure of all American IAEA inspectors, the international community felt a heightened sense of crisis associated with the growing nuclear ambitions of Kim Jong-il. The U.S. described the launch as a “threat to the safety and security of other countries”, which could not go unpunished. Meanwhile, China and Russia dismissed such anxiety by blocking all rebuke of the actions at the UN Security Council.
These diverging positions prompt the obvious question: How imminent is the threat of a nuclear attack? Is nuclear proliferation truly an international crisis, or has it been overrated? Moreover, how does the paradigm of crisis bear on the reality of nuclear proliferation?
In view of the viability of deterrence – through the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), conceptualised during the Cold War – deterrence optimists like Kenneth Waltz suggested that the mass proliferation of nuclear weapons could actually be conducive to peace and stability. This is because the mere possession of nuclear weapons fosters extreme caution and the desire to avoid conflicts, as evidenced by the implicit nuclear nonaggression during the Cold War. In other words, proliferation is no crisis at all. It is a potential tactic in a global strategy of collective security. Some have argued that the call for nuclear non-proliferation is underpinned by the developed world’s neo-imperialist motives of withholding the benefits of nuclear technology from the developing world. For instance, India has argued that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has illegitimately frozen the international status quo and denied India its rightful international recognition as a key regional power.
On the other hand, nuclear pessimists dismiss deterrence optimism as a delusion based on mistaken nostalgia. The Cold War was strewn with close-calls, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, which evidence the precarious nature of a ‘nuclear-induced’ peace. Moreover, the inherent dangers of nuclear proliferation are amplified by the potential irrationality of aspirant nuclear states like North Korea and Iran. Notably, acts of sabotage are not uncommon practices for Tehran and Pyongyang, with examples including the belligerent anti-Israel and Holocaust-denying statements spelt out by Tehran and the support it gives to Hezbollah and other terrorist groups.
For Scott Sagan, the risks of players such as Pakistan and Iran render nuclear proliferation the “most dangerous game”. Islamabad is renowned for being extremely lax in supervising nuclear operations and military personnel with access to nuclear technologies. This is evidenced by the involvement of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist, in a clandestine international network of nuclear weapons technology proliferation programs from Pakistan to North Korea. Even more concerning is the existence of close ties between the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and Al-Qaeda, which suggest the possibility of terrorists groups having access to nuclear weapons.
Whilst all of these may truly be a legitimate basis for labelling nuclear proliferation as an international crisis, the crisis narratives must be used with caution. Such an attitude could breed proliferation fatalism, the belief that any government determined to acquire nuclear weapons will eventually do so, implying that proliferation simply cannot be checked, and there is no point in attempting to curb the inevitable.
This belief fails to consider the fact that many countries have actually curbed their nuclear ambitions. International instruments such as the NPT have so far achieved impressive results, and defiance, though sadly existent, has been limited. Rather than accepting what falsely appears to be inevitable, the international community should work harder to prevent the unthinkable.
President Obama has stated: “This fatalism is a deadly adversary. For if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.”
A more subtle, yet equally unwarranted, use of the crisis paradigm is the deployment of narratives of nuclear threats by political actors, as a means for justifying forceful pre-emptive measures in violation of international norms. The most obvious example, as observed by Roland Danreuther, is the Bush administration’s vigorous endorsement of the ‘rogue-state’ narrative: an exaggeration of the threat of nuclear-active rogue states and the conflation of nuclear proliferation with ‘nuclear terrorism’. This is followed by the proposition that dangers from these ‘bad’ states, often associated with terrorists, need to be pre-empted with new and tougher counter-proliferation measures.
Accordingly, the Bush administration adopted expansive nuclear weapon strategies to strengthen the U.S. retaliation capability. It unshackled itself from the constraints of many international obligations, such as those of the NPT, which were said to be of little use and added to U.S. vulnerability The discourse surrounding the ‘War on Terror’ is an obvious example, with its public targeting of the ‘axis of evil’ and ‘weapons of mass destruction’.
This offensive posture of the U.S. accentuated the sense of insecurity and suspicion among other states, nuclear or not, also inducing them to activate their nuclear capabilities. Ultimately, an over-exaggeration of the nuclear crisis, accompanied by offensive policies, can be counter-productive. It undermines the complex set of agreements dedicated to limiting proliferation. Transparency and confidence are essential for international stability; so the NPT and other verification and inspection procedures, although imperfect, should continue to be consolidated.
With the end of the Bush era and with President Obama’s commitment to international co-operation and the elimination of nuclear weapons, a new era of trust among nations could emerge. Nuclear weapons could once again be strategically devalued, restoring the momentum of disarmament and arms control that began during the Cold War. Bi-polar aggression may have fuelled the movement then, while amity amongst states could be responsible for the change now. The future requires security assurances and major compromises to be offered to aspirant nuclear states in exchange for serious negotiations and tougher inspections measures. Negotiation, as opposed to fatalism or force, needs to characterise the future of nuclear non-proliferation.
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