A Path for Avoiding Nuclear Disaster
Holly Crain makes the case for nuclear non-proliferation.
Global society is currently in the midst of numerous, challenging and complex crises, ranging from the ongoing devastation caused by the financial crisis, to the various humanitarian crises plaguing the developing world. However, none is more devastating than the crisis being produced by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Despite the inconceivable humanitarian threat posed by the use of nuclear weapons, world leaders have continued to respond to this danger with political rhetoric alone, ignoring the urgent need for policy reform from states and international organisations alike. Whilst the military use of nuclear technology may be improbable at this stage, it is by no means impossible, and therefore requires far greater attention.
Though the Cold War fear of nuclear warfare between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has ceased, the continued possession of nuclear weaponry by many states today remains an urgent a security issue. The primary concern is no longer the arms race between two of the world’s great superpowers, but the expanding, horizontal spread of states that are developing efficient nuclear military capabilities. Developing states, most notably India and Pakistan, are now nuclear players. The players in the nuclear game have changed, as has the nature of the game itself and it is vital that the international community begins to respond accordingly.
India and Pakistan officially became nuclear weapon states (NWS) in May 1998, a move that served as a worldwide reminder of the fact that nuclear weapons are not Cold War relics. Recently, the tension between these historically hostile neighbours was heightened by the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008 and escalating conflicts over the disputed region of Kashmir. These events have worsened the instability of an already politically fragile region, and the growing intrastate volatility within both countries, especially Pakistan. India and Pakistan refuse to be a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and are therefore not bound by international law in the conduct of their nuclear programs. It is unrealistic to assume that these are rational states that would never use their nuclear weapons.
The nuclear capacities of India and Pakistan have set dangerous precedents in upholding the political value of becoming a NWS. Since acquiring their official nuclear status, India and Pakistan have benefited from increased international influence and greater political bargaining power, at virtually no cost. This has led states such as Iran and North Korea, which find themselves in even greater political turmoil, to lust after nuclear military capability as a tool for enhancing political strength and strategic security. The political value afforded by the possession of nuclear weapons must be reversed so as to eliminate the incentives of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) becoming NWS.
Realists who advocate deterrence theory, most notably Kenneth Waltz, argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will enhance international security by providing a deterrent to war, due to all parties’ knowledge of the mutual destruction that nuclear weapons would cause. The political value of nuclear weapons, it is argued, lies in the threat they pose, rather than in their actual use. The more states with nuclear weapons, the more peaceful the world should be. Whilst this argument may have been plausible during the Cold War, it no longer reflects the current global situation.
The fatal flaw behind deterrence is the assumption that states always act rationally, according to an informed cost-benefit analysis. As the horizontal proliferation of nuclear developments continues to reach unstable regions, it is naïve and fatally risky to assume that the rationale of mutually assured destruction (MAD) will deter states or other potential actors from using their nuclear weapons. The contemporary international landscape is more complex than the bipolar structure of the late 20th century, and it is a grave mistake to assume that deterrence renders the existence of nuclear weapons a non-issue.
The deficiencies of international organisations and influential states in neglecting to implement effective mechanisms for reducing proliferation must be rectified. The failure to prevent the development of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, a situation known throughout the international community long before both countries’ official tests, paired with the lack of significant punishments for these developments, have greatly weakened the non-proliferation effort. One of the most detrimental failures of the NPT is the incompetent management and oversight of the NPT regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is the primary body responsible for ensuring the peaceful development of nuclear programs globally, as set out in the NPT.
The conflicting priorities of the IAEA have been a major hindrance to effective nuclear supervision. Whilst the organisation’s aim is to thwart nuclear programs that have military purposes, it also aims to promote nuclear development for peaceful purposes. This duality has tended to result in a focus on the progression of nuclear science and technology at the expense of actively pursuing investigations and reporting suspicious
nuclear programs. As the IAEA lacks substantial enforcement credibility, it is little more than an inconvenience to a state wishing to pursue a nuclear weapons program. The recent eviction of IAEA agents from North Korea highlights how easily states can avoid IAEA investigations.
The U.S. has been just as ineffective as the IAEA. Despite being the world’s most influential state, the U.S. has avoided implementing preventative measures against proliferation. Whilst it often loudly condemns nuclear proliferation, its policies and actions have not reflected its rhetoric. The U.S. disarmament process is languishing at best, weakened by the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The favouring of particular states by the U.S. has eroded its legitimacy as a force against the use and development of nuclear military technology. It is often heavily critical of nuclear programs in states such as North Korea and Iran, yet simultaneously sells uranium to India.
Multiple adjustments need to take place to avert widespread nuclear proliferation. Quashing the aspirations of NNWS cannot be achieved by simply attempting to decrease their access to, or the availability of, nuclear technology. The natural evolution of technology will inevitably lead to greater access to nuclear materials and knowledge. Any attempt to reverse this process cannot be sustained and, on its own, is fruitless in preventing proliferation. The most efficient path to prevent the expansion of NWS is to diminish states’ motivations for possessing nuclear weapons. This can be achieved by dramatically increasing the overall cost of attaining nuclear weapons and by decreasing their strategic value.
As discussed, India and Pakistan both pursue nuclear weaponry not only as a security measure, but as a method for heightening their international prestige and influence. Policy changes are needed to reduce the security threats that nuclear states perceive as necessitating the development of nuclear weapons. The greatest tools in cooling hostilities between states are effective diplomacy and extensive communication. The beginnings of direct communication between Iran and the U.S. under the Obama administration will be vital in the effort to curb Iran’s nuclear military intentions. The international community must also indicate that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is condemned globally, by establishing an international norm against their development and by making it clear that states developing nuclear programs for military purposes will be admonished by the global community.
The consequences of developing nuclear weapons need to be tremendously amplified, in ensuring that the political costs of becoming a NWS far outweigh any perceived benefits. There must be a greater use of trade embargos and diplomatic sanctions, as well as more efficient means of policing nuclear transactions and programs between and within states. To further instil the international community’s stance against proliferation, the ability of states to retract from the NPT should be eliminated, and membership to the UN should require mandatory ratification of the NPT.
The expanding global span of states in volatile and politically unstable regions that possess or intend to possess nuclear weapons has the potential to cause a global humanitarian tragedy. We must use all means at our disposal to slow the rate of proliferation as much as possible. Whilst the natural evolution of technology may result in less restricted access to nuclear materials and knowledge, with some non-state actors able to acquire nuclear weapons in the future, this occurrence can be delayed by eliminating the motivations for their development. It may only be a matter of time before the next nuclear weapon is used, but let us extend this time as far as we possibly can.
