Into the Age of Barbarism
Rik Moors considers the future of nuclear proliferation.
In 1949, George Orwell wrote You and the Atom Bomb, an eloquent essay on the effects of the development of the atomic bomb on international relations. In the piece, he prophetically constructs a picture of the imminent Cold War, using the newly acquired atomic power as an important basis for his projection. His argument hinges on the notion that “the history of civilization is largely the history of weapons”. Few nations were capable of building an atomic bomb at that time, and even for those that could, it was a complex, expensive and time-consuming project. This led to Orwell’s realisation that the power of the state would surmount the power of the individual, and that only a few powers would rule the earth for some time to come.
Orwell could have been discussing the modern day when he made the hypothetical remark: “Had the atomic bomb turned out to be something … cheap and easily manufactured, like a bicycle, it might well have plunged us back into barbarism. If, as seems to be the case, it is a rare and costly object, it is likelier to put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely a ‘peace that is no peace’.” The “no peace” was not indefinite, but thankfully nuclear weapon technology has not progressed to the ease of bicycle engineering. However, Orwell assumed the technology to be constant, rather than developing. The history of nuclear proliferation indicates otherwise.
When Orwell wrote this prophetic essay, academia and popular culture were fascinated with the ‘bomb’, the most destructive weapon ever made by humanity. As the Cold War progressed and national interests were elevated, governments and the media strongly linked the nuclear weapons crisis to the communist threat. The impact of this connection was more evident at the end of the Cold War. As the weapons remained in existence and the technology continued to develop, the apocalyptical danger once attributed to them paled. Time passed, and as a new, major global crisis placed terrorists centre stage, a new discourse cast ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ as dangerous tools in the hands of evil dictators and terrorist cells.
The optimism associated with U.S. President Barack Obama was marred by the major financial crisis, and suddenly weapons were propelled to the forefront of policy once more. Nuclear weapons are expensive, and so is nuclear testing. The economy is desperately seeking financial stimulus, and yet large amounts of expensive and arguably unnecessary nuclear material continue to put a heavy strain on government budgets. Decreasing stockpiles thus provides a straightforward strategy through which monetary burdens could be alleviated while consolidating popular support.
“Although we are often reminded that nuclear weapons pose a threat in the hands of terrorists or dictators, the possibility of accidental detonation is equally concerning.”
Although we are often reminded that nuclear weapons pose a threat in the hands of terrorists or dictators, the possibility of accidental detonation is equally concerning. The potential threat of a domino effect is increasingly present as more states gain access to weapons, giving them the potential to control their strategic interests by supplying bomb-related information and material to allied or partner states. The idea of a new superpower satellite race between key players such as the United States, the EU, Russia and China is not as unlikely as it may sound. At some point, when the financial crisis has waned and expansionist motives re-assert themselves, these interests could collide, with dangerous and unpredictable results.
However, the progress of the past 40 years cannot be denied. President Obama is already talking about a “nuclear-free world” and statistics reveal a drastic reduction in nuclear warheads since 1991. At the height of the nuclear arms race in 1986, it was estimated the Soviet Union possessed a 45,000-megaton capacity, with US stockpiles at 25,000 megatons; the other nuclear powers possessed a fraction of these numbers. Recently, the global total has diminished to approximately 22,000 megatons.
Following the construction of the South African atom bomb during Apartheid, Professor Renfrew Christie, the Dean of Research at the University of the Western Cape, was imprisoned for several years as a nuclear spy. Today, as an expert on nuclear proliferation, he advises the new South African army and government on nuclear policy. Does the current nuclear situation reflect a crisis, according to Christie? The bare statistics gain new meaning when he notes that in 1967, the United States alone had the capability of killing every human being on earth seven million times. By way of contrast, the nuclear stockpiles today would “merely” be capable of killing every human being on earth two million times. “Please don’t call that a crisis,” Christie begs, “because a crisis means something that could kill you immediately, either today or tomorrow.”
The diminishment of stockpiles is unlikely to worsen the nuclear situation, but the likelihood of the United States, the Russian Federation, China, or even France abandoning their stockpiles entirely is not promising. This raises an important question: does it really make a difference whether individual nations have the ability to destroy humanity two million times over, or ‘only’ half a million times?
“Does it really make a difference whether individual nations have the ability to destroy humanity two million times over, or ‘only’ half a million times?”
Other anti-proliferation measures include pushing for the universal ratification of more treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which attempts to ban nuclear weapons testing, unsubstantiated threats of more substantial retaliation against aspiring nuclear powers, and to work towards a “global nuclear fuel bank”. Most states have openly applauded President Obama’s approach, but a leaked statement from the French Government indicated that the French “don’t believe there’s a link between disarmament and the proliferation question”. The French are not alone; historians and nuclear weapons experts, like Mr. Christie, also remain sceptical.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 allows the five permanent Security Council members to possess nuclear weapons. The countries that are not privileged in this respect were induced into signing the Treaty by the assurance of P5 assistance to states that would want to use fissile material for peaceful purposes. Christie is convinced that the NPT is no more than a ‘paper tiger’, as Article 10 allows states to leave the Treaty with three months’ notice if the member senses a nuclear threat. The main appeal of the Treaty is its voluntarism, but this makes enforcement both essential and practically impossible.
The reward for compliance with the NPT is help with, and/or allowance of, national nuclear energy initiatives. This also poses a problem: where North Korea effectively used the Article 10 nuclear threat loophole, Iran seems to take its nuclear ambitions down the “safe atomic programs” path.
Iran is a large oil exporter, hence the reason why critics have dismissed its nuclear energy initiatives as unnecessary. ‘Safe’ plants still have excess radioactive material, which in the wrong hands could allow aspiring nuclear powers to act out their deadly fantasies. Fissile material is the only practical obstacle to weaponisation, because the infrastructure and knowledge necessary are readily available and relatively inconspicuous.
George Orwell envisaged a state of barbarism arising if nuclear weapons became simple to create, as all states and scattered individuals and groups would be capable of wielding their massive power. Today, this barbarism does not seem to have taken over, but Christie and others nonetheless describe the current international state of affairs as one of anarchy. Approximately 60 states worldwide are seen to have the economic and industrial capability to produce nuclear weapons. It would seem reassuring that so few of these capable powers have chosen to adopt this technology. In order to appreciate the situation in its entirety, it is important to understand why these countries have been deterred in the past. The conventional view, which forms the basis of the NPT and other solutions based on international cooperation, largely attributes this to the reliability and success of international commitments.
However, some scholars, particularly those who are influenced by geopolitical policy analysis, argue against this view. During the Cold War, the allied countries on both sides had similar security interests, which allowed for more interdependence, causing the risk associated with owning or developing nuclear weapons to outweigh the benefits to national security. Recent developments in geopolitics have caused a significant shift away from, if not a complete reversal of, this scenario.
It is this fluid nature of international relations that renders the situation precarious. As long as other states have nuclear weapons, no single state will be willing to completely give them up. And as long as some states covet nuclear weapons technology, their enemies will be compelled to follow suit.
The major powers might reduce their nuclear stockpiles in order to alleviate some pressure from their respective budgets, but this may not deter other countries from starting programs or obtaining material and information. As local stockpiles diminish, countries like the United States and China might choose to diversify their weapons positioning by placing nukes in friendly countries, supporting or condemning allies who want to start nuclear programs, and even actively helping them.
The novelty of the nuclear weapon has altered history. As long as plutonium and uranium bombs continue to exist, we are potentially on the brink of crisis. As economies develop and weapon technology thrives, the measures against nuclear proliferation remain inadequate. It seems the only thing that would pose a serious threat to nuclear proliferation is the development of an equally, or more advanced, non-nuclear weapon. We may have left the Cold War far behind, but the nuclear threat persists. A new age of barbarism could be lurking just around the corner.
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