Two Sides of the Coin: U.S. Imperialism

Camilla Green, Geoffrey Winters and Lewis D’Avigdor parse the motives of the world’s sole remaining superpower.

HEADS

The proliferation of American influence is neatly encapsulated by a 1989 statement from the spokesman for former Soviet President Michael Gorbachev: “We now follow the Frank Sinatra Doctrine: I’ll do it my way.”

Imperial behaviour is a necessary fixture in maintaining a civilised world order. In the last century, three serious contenders – the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan – vied for the role the U.S. occupies today. The acts that accompanied the U.S. ascendancy to ‘superpower’ status seem positively angelic compared with those of Stalin, Hitler and General Hirohito.

Whilst negative perceptions of America’s quasi-imperial behaviour abound, its actions reflect a benevolent concern for global security. The liberal ideals of Wilsonianism, informed by a sincere desire to free the world from tyranny, prevailed throughout the twentieth century.

At the close of World War Two, America stepped into a deserted playing field in dire need of strong leadership. While the United States’ 700 military bases scattered across the globe could be perceived as a form of imperial coercion, they are the means by which America maintains the social and political stability of the current world order.

Perhaps the negative connotations of the term ‘imperialism’ prove more of a terminological quandary than a substantive one. Considering its overwhelming resources, it is arguably America’s duty alone to safeguard the world. The Bush Administration’s military expenditure budget allowance for 2009 ($711 billion) accounted for 48 per cent of the world’s total military spending.

“Considering its overwhelming resources, it is arguably America’s duty alone to safeguard the world.”

American influence extends beyond the reach of the military, to the economic and cultural spheres. The 1947 Marshall Plan is an example of America’s benevolent peacetime foreign policy initiatives, with $13.3 billion dedicated to post-war European recovery. And just think of the American cultural legacy: Mickey Mouse, Andy Warhol, Microsoft, baseball, and Calvin Klein, to say nothing of rock’n’roll.

Inevitably, constant positioning in the public eye over the decades has fuelled anti-Americanism. This has not been lost on the U.S. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledges “a new and deadly ideology of hatred that we cannot ignore” and the need to “confront hateful propaganda, dispel dangerous myths, and get out the truth”.

Nor is the Obama Administration unaware of the errors of its predecessors. President Obama advocates a “kinder, gentler America”, working tirelessly to improve international public opinion, with both symbolic gestures (identifying Afghanistan as the ‘right’ war, and Iraq as the ‘wrong’ war) and substantive ones (the closure of Guantánamo Bay).

An imperial-esque America increasingly aware of the repercussions of its actions and its global reputation is certainly ‘a good thing’.

Camilla Green is in her third year of a combined degree in Law and Arts, majoring in History. Geoffrey Winters is in his third year of a combined degree in Law and Arts.

TAILS

Talk of empire reached fever pitch following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the discussion moving from academic circles into the popular mainstream. The Bush Administration’s consistent denial of empire belied the centuries-old, yet deeply flawed, trope of American exceptionalism. All that was left was to ascertain whether empire was good or bad.

Public outcry, manifested by the greatest anti-war demonstrations since Vietnam, was a testament to the fact that public opinion had swung against the Bush Administration, what with its doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence and the cowboy-in-chief’s if-you’re-not-with-us-you’re-against-us bravado.

If you asked the Iraqis, who matter most, only 1 per cent believe the U.S. sought to foster democracy and peace in the region, whereas 43 per cent believe the invasion was an oil grab.

Moreover, the great cost of the invasion – a hallmark of U.S. ‘hard power’ – proved beyond the pale of even the benevolent and well-meaning empire.  The lives of American troops serving in Iraq, to say nothing of the civilian death toll, was too high a price to pay for freedom and democracy.

Neo-liberals who believe America should be in the business of exporting liberty need only look to the quagmire in Afghanistan or Iraq to see the futility of their quixotic vision.  Democracy-building during the Bush era was a dismal failure.

Enter Obama. As Obamarama gripped the U.S. and then the world, it seemed America was renouncing its claim to global hegemony, or at the very least adopting a less cavalier attitude. The resounding catchcry, ‘yes, we can!’, united a country split by partisan politics. Obama tapped into a growing wave of discontent, a Zeitgeist demanding change – due, in no small part, to the recent failure of neo-imperial foreign policy.

Obama provided a moral facelift. Anti-America slogans were beginning to sound passé. Who could plausibly claim a black man in the Whitehouse would take up the mantle of the White Man’s burden?

Yet this is largely what has happened. Obama’s presidency provided much-needed yet superficial plastic surgery. As one Clinton aide put it, “Obama adopts the Violin model: holding power with the left hand, whilst playing music with the right.” Indeed, Obama has not ruled out using force to protect America’s vital interests abroad, even in circumstances short of self-defence.

Whilst Obama seeks to distinguish himself from the Bush Administration by advocating multilateralism, his philosophy still smacks of American hegemony. And with his approval rating at a sky-high 64 per cent (Bush’s was 62), one can reasonably ask whether Obama can do no wrong. The answer? Yes, he can!

Lewis D’Avigdor is in his third year of a combined degree in Law and Arts.

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