Antiquated Ideologies and The Next Ten Words
Edward Cohen and David Robert Howell dissect the idea of a ‘league of democracies’.
“History has returned,” writes Robert Kagan, “and the democracies must come together to shape it, or others will shape it for them.” This penultimate sentence in the first section of The Return of History and the End of Dreams not only forms the core premise of Kagan’s short book, but it also serves as a proverb for the Republican presidential candidate, Senator John McCain. Kagan’s concluding call for a league of democracies has become a major element of McCain’s foreign policy platform. The Senator has explicitly put it forward as a key foreign policy objective.
In this sense, despite merely being an extended essay, the size of Kagan’s book is inversely proportional to its influence. McCain has endorsed it, employed its author as a key advisor to his campaign, and even been photographed with the book on his desk. Most significantly, the Senator has often quoted verbatim from the book when questioned about tensions with Russia, frustrations with Iran, or concerns over a rising China.
With elections breaking on the horizon and ‘change’ the mantra of the populace, there is potential for the next administration of the United States to redefine its position in the world. Of all of the sources that could potentially fuel such a shift in grand strategy, few seem to carry the leverage of The Return of History and the ‘league of democracies’. It is clear that Kagan and the league have had direct influence on the foreign policy principles of a potential president of the United States. However, knowing whether such influence is admirable is less clear. By dissecting The Return of History and the recommendation for a ‘league of democracies’, this article will determine whether such influence is good and, if not, what should replace it.
Kagan and the Return of History
Kagan, a leading public intellectual, has written an essay that, like its predecessor, Of Paradise and Power, is highly provocative and assertive. It comes as no surprise for readers who are familiar with Kagan’s work. In fact, readers have come to expect nothing less from this towering neo-conservative thinker. Nevertheless, since publishing shorter, less substantiated versions of his thesis in Policy Review and Commentary, Kagan has had time to refine his argument and provide a more rigorous presentation of what he perceives to be the rise of a new and assertive authoritarianism as evinced in the contemporary actions of a rising China, a resurgent Russia and a cantankerous Iran.
“Kagan contends that we are returning to a battle between contending ideologies – a struggle between autocracy and democracy.”
By suggesting that the rise of a new authoritarianism is not transitory but a thriving and legitimate alternative to liberal democracy, Kagan makes a welcome addition to the ‘End of History’ debate first instigated by Francis Fukuyama. In contrast with the great theoretician of the inevitable denouement of the democratic order, Kagan contends that we are not, in fact, reaching a new era of the triumph of liberal democracy and the end of the historical struggle between other, competing political ideologies. Instead, we are returning to a battle between contending ideologies – a struggle between autocracy and democracy, which superseded the Cold War struggle between communism and liberalism, and which will likely continue.
In maintaining this position, Kagan first suggests that history, as Fukuyama described it, has returned. He states that “the world has become normal again” and that “the old competition between liberalism and autocracy has reemerged, with the world’s great powers increasingly lining up according to the nature of their regimes”. Second, Kagan insists that liberal democratic countries should stand up, take up their mantle of responsibility to shape history and the future international order, or risk having it shaped for them. In presenting these two key arguments, Kagan draws the reader towards the event horizon of his foremost policy recommendation – ‘the league of democracies’.
A League of Democracies
The idea of an alliance or ‘league of democracies’ represents the sharp end of an attempt by Kagan and other neo-conservatives to wedge their way back into America’s foreign policy debate. As they see it, effective action to mitigate today’s globalised threats is being restricted by the increasing dispersion of power towards new, rising nations – particularly China, Russia and Iran. The expansionist ambitions and authoritarian behaviour of these three nations are increasingly at odds with the West and its attempt to expand global norms such as democratic governance, human rights and non-proliferation.
McCain says the league would be a “global compact” that would “harness the vast influence of the more than 100 democratic nations around the world to advance our values and defend our shared interests”. Establishing the league would help to “revive the democratic solidarity that united the West during the Cold War”. The United Nations and other international institutions should be bypassed if they prove unable or unwilling to authorise fast and effective action. The idea is that like-minded democratic countries should convene to discuss solutions to humanitarian crises, including the possibility of imposing sanctions and military action against rogue regimes. These like-minded democratic countries should also develop common positions on other transnational threats. Proponents of democracy argue that, as democracy is the only legitimate form of political organisation, the league could potentially authorise itself to mount interventions when its members saw fit.
Even some moderate conservatives, exasperated by what they regard as a logjam in international cooperation, believe that a ‘league of democracies’ might be the only solution. David Brooks of the New York Times recently wrote that: “Ever since the Berlin Wall fell, people have looked at the way Harry Truman, George C. Marshall, Dean Acheson and others created forward-looking global institutions after World War II, and they’ve asked: ‘Why can’t we rally that kind of international cooperation to confront terrorism, global warming, nuclear proliferation and the rest of today’s problems?’… If democracies could concentrate authority in such a league, at least part of the world would have a mechanism for wielding authority.”
“McCain says the league would be a ‘global compact’ that would ‘harness the vast influence of the more than 100 democratic nations’”
However, the ‘league of democracies’ is not just the newest head of the neo-conservative hydra. The idea of revitalising America’s democracy promotion efforts has also led several prominent liberal commentators to support a league in the form of a concert of democracies. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, co-directors of the Princeton Project on National Security, have suggested that such an organisation could be the “institutional embodiment and ratification of the democratic peace” and could serve as a “focal point for efforts to strengthen liberty under law around the world”. This forum could assist in strengthening democratic practice around the world through operational agencies dedicated to technical assistance for elections, civil society development and the development of democratic habits. More broadly, it could help lock America into an internationalist orientation and provide a fresh means for America’s democratic allies to influence American foreign policy.
And its Discontents
The idea of such a league has ignited a storm of protest from foreign policy analysts of a more sceptical realist and small ‘c’ conservative hue. The first objection, raised by Gideon Rachman of The Financial Times, is “how are we to define democracy?” According to McCain, there are approximately 100 democracies. Yet, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, two liberal proponents, believe there are 60 democracies, based on criteria from the Freedom House think tank. Kagan responded to this problem with breathtaking naivety by arguing that the league could simply pass around the European Union’s current admissions form. However, Adopting Kagan’s standard would drastically restrict membership and shut out many emerging, if not fully liberal, democratic states.
Yet the problem goes well beyond definitions. Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and an expert of democracy promotion, points out that democracies frequently disagree with one another, and that similarity of regime type does not necessarily equate to common perspectives on international problems. Moreover, the assumption that democracies will see eye to eye on solutions to global problems constitutes a misunderstanding about how countries construct their foreign policy and national interests.
One of the most troubling aspects of this debate is that proponents of the league are very vague as to what exactly it will entail. McCain said he will convene a summit of the world’s democracies to “seek their views” and Kagan also wants a kind of ‘talking-shop’ to canvass opinions. (It is quite remarkable that conservatives of various stripes have suddenly discovered the benefits of consultation and talking when, only recently, they were loudly trumpeting the necessity of unilateralism). If this really is a battle for the future of civilisation, why advocate such a minimal step? Perhaps it is easier to build consensus through direct talks rather than a formal institution. However, if that is true, why do we need a new organisation at all? Existing diplomatic dialogues and exchanges could simply be given more emphasis.
Unless the league’s proponents suggest how an organisation of democratic governments would add anything to the cause of tackling global issues such as climate change, terrorism, unfair trade barriers and so on, any such organisation is likely to be stillborn. Given that these challenges are inherently transnational and that the global power structure looks less unipolar by the day, basing cooperation on the premise that vital players, such as China, Russia and Iran, should be excluded is hardly going to produce effective solutions.
Antiquated Ideologies
Indeed, the league risks embodying the worst aspects of Wilsonianism in its untempered and simplistic idealism. It risks returning to antiquated ideologies that could catapult humanity down the path of a new cold war. If Russia and China feel that American policy is going to cut them out of international cooperation because of their regime type, then the league’s legacy is likely to be global division, not cooperation. For example, it is difficult to envisage the possibility of advancing global cooperation on nuclear arms control if Russia and China are designated as being ‘out of line’ from the beginning. As such, the league risks precipitating the very ideological confrontation it ostensibly seeks to avoid.
Even suggesting that such a league could be established presupposes some degree of consensus amongst the world’s democracies over how to approach Russia and China. However, the complex web of economic relations through which many states relate to these resurgent giants is producing only a greater diversity of views between the putative members of the league. In this context, pushing for a ‘league of democracies’ along the lines that McCain and Kagan advocate could produce the remarkable outcome of being both divisive and unworkable at the same time.
“Assumption that democracies will see eye to eye constitutes a misunderstanding about how countries construct their foreign policy.”
McCain has already advocated ejecting Russia from the G8 and restarting the aborted quadrilateral defence cooperation between the U.S., Australia, Japan and India, an arrangement initially touted as a ‘dialogue of democracies’. Australia quite rightly backed out of this arrangement. If future security structures in East Asia are based on the drawing of ideological battle lines, they will be neither inclusive nor contribute to the maintenance of peace. However, as much as McCain and Kagan may dislike the regimes in Beijing and Moscow, they would do well to heed the advice of Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution. Talbott recently stated that, however appropriate indignation and outrage may be, when it comes to these regimes, “outrage … and indignation is not a policy”.
A salutary lesson for the proponents of the league should be the fate of the so-called Community of Democracies. This body, created in the last year of the Clinton administration, was designed to be a coalition of democratic countries that would work together to strengthen democracy around the world. The record of the Community of Democracies has been very poor. Despite a huge number of ministerial conferences and working-group meetings, its greatest achievement to-date has been a short statement against Burma in 2003. However, it has been resoundingly silent when it comes to praising governments that do take steps towards greater democratisation.
Contrary to the claims of some of the league’s proponents, the reason for the Community’s inaction stems not from the inclusion of non-democracies such as Morocco, but from the concern that the Community is a U.S.-driven organisation that might undermine the UN. Even staunchly pro-U.S. democracies such as Japan, Canada and Australia, can be expected to balk at joining organisations that will be seen as a U.S. initiative to spread its particular vision of democracy.
And the next ten words
The fundamental difficulty with the Return of History thesis and the idea of the ‘league of democracies’ is not that the objectives are undesirable, but rather that the morality of those objectives is intrinsically tied to the practicalities of the real world. Kagan, McCain and their league suffer from a narrow definition of morality that conveniently rejects pragmatism and neglects the concrete politicking and patience necessary for increased cooperation and progress on global matters. They risk the inherent vice of neo-conservatism: the propensity for a Manichaean paranoia that views the world in black and white and either ‘with us or against us’ terms. In doing so, they neglect the grays of states in transition and the uncertainty of rising powers that defy easy classification.
“Basing cooperation on the premise that vital players should be excluded is hardly going to produce effective solutions.”
Superimposing such a simplistic vision of the world is no answer. Simply claiming a new mandate of heaven based on presumed moral certainty will end up being divisive and counter-productive unless it is also tied to a rigorous analysis of how this sort of cooperation can be most effectively achieved on a case-by-case basis. A more practical alternative to the ‘league of democracies’ would be to argue for improvements and reforms to existing international institutions and to pursue more case-by-case cooperation. This would include pushing for greater global enmeshment, developing a stronger web of sustained dialogues and relationships with the aim of more integration in the structure of the international system.
If we cannot solve problems either without the major players, as the league assumes, or within the United Nations system, then surely we should start to look at inclusive, flexible and thinly-institutionalised mechanisms, like the six-party talks, to break deadlocks where they arise and advance cooperation where necessary. The real question should be: “whose cooperation do we need to achieve our objectives?” rather than a bland claim that we need a whole new institution. At the very least, trying to use ‘democracy’ as the unifying principle is not likely to achieve anything but generate greater division.
Ultimately, the weakness of The Return of History and the proposed league of democracies is its simplicity. In an episode in the fourth series of The West Wing, President Bartlet, who is running for re-election against the Republican Governor of Florida, challenges his opponent’s simplistic claim that taxes should be cut because “the American people know how to spend their money better than the federal government”. Bartlet responds: “What are the next ten words of that statement? How are we going to do it? You tell me that and I’ll drop out of the race right now.” Until Kagan, McCain and the other proponents of the league of democracies can do the same, their ideological bluster should not take the place of thoughtful, nuanced analysis on how international cooperation can really be advanced.
Oct 31st, 2008 at 12:25 am
I want to hear more about this David Robert Howell!