The Unheard Voices of Islam: Southeast Asia’s Struggle with Fundamentalism

Eshan Motwani and Jemimah Roberts explore methods of challenging contemporary fundamentalism.

Current rhetoric surrounding the ‘War on Terror’, combined with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, has thrust the issue of Islamic fundamentalism back into international discourse. Within Southeast Asia, there has recently been a noticeable growth in fundamentalist interpretations of Islam amongst its Muslim communities, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation, with over 86 per cent of its 237 million strong population being Muslim. In the neighbouring state of Malaysia, Muslims account for over 60 per cent of its 25 million people. Within these two nations, two distinctive variants of Islam dominate.

The Wahhabi School, dominant in conservative Arab societies and among Islamic radicals, encompasses a rigid interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. It involves the rejection of innovation and critical thinking, or ijtihad, advocating that the Quran must be read literally. Further, it calls for the establishment of a pan-Islamic state, governed through Shariah law, in an attempt to replicate seventh-century Medina.

“While more conservative views should by no means be excluded, such views should not be granted a monopoly within public and governmental discourses.”

According to Professor Lily Rahim, the 1970s oil crisis was the catalyst for the introduction of literalist Islam into Southeast Asia. Nations like Saudi Arabia that had recently become wealthy due to an abundance of oil, financed organisations to promote fundamentalist Islamic interpretations of the Quran.

Standing in stark contrast is the liberal variant of Islam that values theological flexibility, socioeconomic justice, inclusion, gender equality, political pluralism and ijtihad. In particular, liberal and progressive Islamists view ijtihad as pivotal in facilitating Islam’s relevance to the needs of the time, place and history. Furthermore, its followers do not espouse the need for a pan-Islamic state.

Acknowledging Southeast Asia’s Islamic Historical Legacy

A common misperception of Islam in Southeast Asia pertains to its origin. The variant found within this region can be traced to India and is more moderate in nature than that found in the Middle East. While the spread of Islam in other regions of the world such as South Asia and the Arab Middle East was through military conquests, in Southeast Asia it was traders who were responsible for its introduction. The region saw a subsequent transformation into a ‘softer’ Islam through the incorporation of strong elements of Sufi Islam.

Although Islam in Southeast Asia is generally moderate in nature, a study conducted for the United States Congress by Bruce Vaughn reported that certain sectors of society are experiencing a process of revivalist variation. According to Vaughn, an important contributing factor to this situation is the region’s relations with Afghanistan, the Middle East and Pakistan. He suggests that numerous Southeast Asians have adopted an anti-Western attitude after returning from these regions and have further embraced radical, militant and extremist forms of Islam.

“An appreciation of the historical process by which Islam arrived in the region and an understanding of the nature of Sufi-inspired Islam are … critical.”

An appreciation of the historical process by which Islam arrived in the region and an understanding of the nature of Sufi-inspired Islam are therefore critical. The nature of Islam was tailored to the region through a long process. To neglect this distinct form of Sufi-inspired Islam, as opposed to its Wahhabi variant, would be effectively to abandon knowledge of the historical processes that were responsible for both its presence and proliferation.

Consequently, it is crucial that adequate resources are provided so that Muslims who do have this historical legacy can, where appropriate, promote and embrace this distinction. A role thus lies with the government in helping to provide such public awareness.

Possible forums through which this knowledge could be facilitated include both the grassroots level in primary schools, in order to develop an early understanding in infants, and at the tertiary level in universities. Active encouragement would thus contribute to differentiating moderate Sufi-inspired Islam from the more narrow fundamentalist interpretations that find their genesis in a specific historical legacy.

The Power of Discourse

The case study of Malaysia reveals the power of discourse in shaping and reflecting religious interpretation. As explored by Professor Lily Rahim, an intense discursive competition between the two major parties (the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)) for the ‘Muslim vote’ precipitated an escalation in conservative Islamic public policy. During the 1990s, the promotion of liberal Islamic reforms such as gender rights, democratisation, and religious tolerance were largely excluded from mainstream political discourse. Those who supported them were subject to intimidation from both government and conservative Islamic groups.

“Efforts to improve the quality of governance and address localised sources of discontent could help to counter the spread of fundamentalist interpretations.”

This curtailment of open debate and politicisation of Islam generated a narrower and more exclusive manifestation of the faith.By contrast, numerous discursive initiatives within Indonesia have promoted a generally less literal form of Islam. The Liberal Islam Network (JIL) endeavours to “create dialogue rooms that are open and free from any pressures of conservatism”. Constructive engagement with debates regarding Shariah law, jihad, democratisation, secularisation, pluralism, gender and human rights provide the opportunity for perceived contradictions within literal Islam to be exposed.

Rahim also notes that the Liberal Islam Network has unreservedly denounced the terrorist actions of militant Islamic organisations such as al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah. By challenging the legitimacy of extremism, this exemplifies a self-determined way of countering fundamentalist interpretations in mainstream discourse and public perception.

The promotion of open forums and constructive engagement with all issues pertaining to Islam is likewise crucial. While more conservative views should by no means be excluded, such views should not be granted a monopoly within public and governmental discourses. The work of Greg Fealy in analysing Indonesian electoral trends from 1955 to the present, demonstrates a shift towards more pluralistic and moderate interpretations. It is imperative that these interpretations begin to deeply permeate public, governmental, and media discourses in order that more radical interpretations no longer remain unchallenged.

The Role of International Cooperation?

The advances of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam in the region by groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah have resulted in numerous cases of violence and terrorism. In 2004, the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change declared that while both strong and weak nations are at risk against terrorists, “international terrorist groups prey on weak states for sanctuary”. The prospect of international cooperation from nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia in successfully confronting Islamic terrorist groups is certainly desirable. Through a joint international effort, these nations are given the opportunity, intelligence and means to further restrict the spread of fundamentalist interpretations.

Active collaboration between Southeast Asian governments, other nations and the international Islamic community are essential to achieving the common goal of removing terrorist cells. In a study conducted for the Hudson Institute, scholar Rohan Gunaratna suggested that, in order to facilitate international cooperation, the following are required: a harmonisation of legislation, an exchange of personnel, a sharing of information and experience, joint training and combined operations.

“The prospect of international cooperation from nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia in successfully confronting Islamic terrorist groups is certainly desirable.”

Efforts made by the international Islamic community in denouncing terrorism in the name of Islam should be acknowledged and encouraged. A possible initiative here would be the establishment of a network of clerics who preach the peaceful nature of Islam. Such a community would help to establish a voice that strongly and regularly denounces terrorism in the name of Islam, and further provides fundamentalists with the knowledge that clerics of their own faith condemn their actions. In 2005, for example, Muslim clerics from around the world met at the International Islamic Conference in Jordan. In this instance, 170 clerics condemned all acts of terrorism committed in the name of Islam.

The Root of Discontent

Past instances of state failure to address socio-economic and political injustices have been linked to dramatic expressions of discontent, and the Southeast Asian example is no exception. As noted by Rahim in the Discursive Contest between Literal and Liberal Islam in Southeast Asia, the reluctance and inability of governments to effectively provide education, political stability, civil liberties and economic prosperity renders the Wahhabi school of Islam an attractive vehicle for change.

The Indonesian example effectively illustrates this point. Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna in their report, Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia, argue that a stagnant Indonesian economy has spawned significant socio-economic dislocation, increasing the appeal of groups such as Laskar Jihad. Like its Middle Eastern counterparts Hamas and Hezbollah, the group advocates armed struggle and, quite importantly, promotes social welfare.

This has proved problematic as it undermines attempts to condemn fundamentalist acts, given that such organisations are legitimised through their often sole provision of social services. Efforts to improve the quality of governance and address localised sources of discontent could thus help to counter the spread of fundamentalist interpretations by diminishing the appeal of radical Islam.

Reinforcing democratic structures and institutions is crucial for the implementation of such strategies. Desker and Ramakrishna note that post-Suharto Indonesia, in particular, has not featured a strong central administration. Thus, the state apparatus must be strengthened so that directives from Jakarta are implemented on the ground. Additionally, Rahim asserts that radical Islamists are likely to become increasingly reactionary and prone to violence when democratic space is restricted, social justice denied and dissenting political views suppressed. This points to the need for political liberalisation and reform.

Looking Forward

In light of the fundamentalist revival, all relevant responses need to be explored. The Southeast Asian example in particular demands engagement with historical Sufi-inspired Islam, the power of discourse, international cooperation and continued political liberalisation. Australia’s cooperation in intelligence and security would be ideal to complement the efforts of our Southeast Asian neighbours.