The Price of Justice in Lebanon
On January 12, 2011, 11 ministers representing Hezbollah and its allies resigned from Lebanon’s national unity government, causing it to collapse. This furthered the political crisis over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a United Nations-backed tribunal investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The resignations were not entirely unexpected – the Lebanese government had been dysfunctional for several months, owing to media speculation surrounding the STL which continues to divide the nation.
Initially, investigators claimed Syrian officials were responsible for Hariri’s killing. This claim has not been publicly dismissed. However, by mid-2009, various news outlets revealed that the STL was preparing to indict members of Hezbollah, a Lebanese political and military organisation composed predominantly of Shia Muslims. It is also financially and militarily supported by the governments of Iran and Syria. While such rumours persisted, Hezbollah stepped up its attempt to contain the domestic fallout, as its leaders verbally denounced the STL as an “American-Israeli tool” designed to undermine the Hezbollah movement.
By October 2010, Hezbollah had called for an end to the Lebanese government’s financial support for the Tribunal, and the withdrawal of all Lebanese judges. However, the Government circumvented a direct response to these demands, leading to fractious cabinet sessions, and ultimately the Government’s demise.
These events highlight the severe tensions that can exist between peace and justice. Undoubtedly, the STL presents an opportunity to counter rampant impunity for political assassinations with a culture of accountability. However, a report from a 2010 Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) meeting entitled ‘The Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Quest for Truth, Justice and Stability’ noted that an insistence on retributive justice poses an obstacle to stability, as those accused of committing serious crimes continue to exercise political power. Those indicted by the criminal justice system cannot be expected to participate simultaneously in a peace process. Often, political stalemate in Lebanon transforms into sectarian violence. Lebanon has long been a ‘casualty of compromise’, and many continue to call for the abandonment of the STL’s pursuit of truth, in order to preserve stability.
The legal legitimacy of the STL has also been debated. As explained by a 2007 Chatham House paper titled ‘The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN on Trial?’, the STL bypasses Lebanese constitutional procedures, and is the first international tribunal with subject-matter jurisdiction encompassing only criminal offences defined by reference to domestic law. As it only has jurisdiction over the criminal act of terror that caused the death of Rafik Hariri and 22 others, there is concern that the STL may be a fleeting injection of justice, without any enduring impact.
It can also be argued that, realistically, Lebanon does not have the capacity to perform the likely demands of the STL. For example, if arrest warrants were issued against Hezbollah, the organisation’s political and military strength would make it virtually impossible for the state to undertake such warrants. As a system of justice alien to the operations of Lebanon, the STL will clearly demand actions that require foreign assistance.
Foreign involvement in Lebanon is pervasive. As described by Paul Salem of the Carnegie Middle East Centre, the country falls on the “fault line of several major confrontations”. As a result, when considering the value of this intervention the international community must ensure that, if and when a resolution is reached, it is enforced.
In contrast, Mohammed Bazzi of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that this latest calamity cannot be attributed solely to the STL. He contends that these issues must be traced to their foundations in the entrenched sectarian political system, specifically the power-sharing formula instituted by the 1943 National Pact and the 1989 Ta’if Agreement. This system was designed to keep a balance between the 18 recognised religious sects, by stipulating that power must be divided between a Maronite Christian president, a Sunni Muslim prime minister and a Shia Muslim speaker of parliament.
While outwardly pluralist, the Lebanese society is largely polarised among and within sects, and the mechanisms of a civil polity do not exist. The confessional system has resulted in a weak state structure: autonomous Lebanese political institutions failed to develop following independence in 1943, and the nation remains subject to the persuasion of traditionally powerful clans. As Lebanese sociologist Samir Khalaf explains, existing parties are so closely identified with sectarian groups and so unconcerned with a larger national identity that disintegration among them is easily generated.
It remains unknown when the STL will issue its indictments. While the Prime Minister-designate Najib Miqati attempts to form a government, the country remains in a leaderless period of uncertainty. If and when this crisis is resolved, history demonstrates that another is likely to emerge unless the root causes of Lebanon’s instability are addressed.
Stephanie Zughbi is currently doing a Bachelor of Laws and a Bachelor of Arts, majoring in Chinese Studies.
