Operation Ajax: the CIA, Iran and Mossadegh
“If I sit silently, I have sinned” – Dr Mossadegh, ousted Prime Minister of Iran, 1953
The 1953 Coup
In 1953 the United States, in co-operation with Britain, instigated the CIA’s first ever coup d’état to depose Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Dr Mohammad Mossadegh. These events were largely excluded from Western media.
Labelled by the CIA as ‘Operation Ajax’, this little-known event in world history has forever changed the geo-political landscape of the Middle East, redefining Iranian and Western relations and continuing to affect the broader framework of relations (or lack thereof) between Iran and the West. As scholars such as Stephen Kinzer and Mark Gasiorowski have argued, the coup (which restored the unelected monarch, the Shah of Iran, to his post) provides contextual insight into Iran’s extreme backlash against the U.S., which arguably provided the conditions conducive to the Revolution of 1979.
Consequently, the coup serves as a historical reminder of the realist objectives which have driven U.S. foreign policy and which continue to influence current political dynamics throughout the Middle East.
This article seeks to analyse the sheer dynamics of the coup, and to relate Western complicity in the deposition of Iranian democracy to the complex array of affairs which define the modern Middle East. It suggests that current Iranian-U.S. relations have their roots in a bloody and illegal past perpetrated by the West.
Mossadegh’s Popular Nationalisation of Iran’s Oil Industry
This illegal encroachment into the affairs of the Iranian nation was devised through the collaborative efforts of the U.S. and UK, who organised the detailed logistics of the coup in an attempt to secure continued exploitation of Iran’s vast petroleum resources.
Heavily reliant on Iran’s oil throughout World War Two, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now known as British Petroleum) was faced with a serious blow to its profitability when Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Dr Mossadegh, nationalised the Iranian oil industry with an unprecedented popular mandate. His nationalist rhetoric drew support from vast sectors of Iranian society and particularly the rural poor, many of whom had suffered from British exploitation of Iran’s lucrative oil industry.
Mossadegh’s attempt to distribute the profits of Iran’s petroleum industry to Iranians themselves was steadfastly rejected by the British. Engaging in a mass anti-Mossadegh campaign, the British sought the support of Iran’s pro-Western leader, the Shah. More importantly, they lobbied the United States, which had previously expressed sympathy under President Harry Truman for both Mossadegh and, arguably, Iran’s democratic cause.
The nationalisation issue rose to the height of international arbitration, with Mossadegh’s nationalist rhetoric and unprecedented popularity within Iran facilitating his emergence as both a colossal figure in world history, and a champion of the Third World. While the Shah was faced with an increasing backlash from his own people, Mossadegh was named Time magazine’s Man of the Year in 1951, stunning the world with his insistence that Iran’s oil remained the property of Iran – a concept that was unheard of at the time, given Britain’s assumption that it would continue to exploit Iran’s oil for its own imperial objectives without opposition.
Although Mossadegh’s appeal to the United Nations was well received by most, evoking sympathy even from within the United States, Britain grew even more steadfast and desperate in its opposition.
The U.S. Joins Britain
Experiencing extreme frustration at their inability to bribe Mossadegh or to court the Truman administration, the British pounced on the newly elected U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower. By conflating Iran’s nationalisation cause with that of communism, the British exploited the evident Cold War tensions which pervaded the American political psyche throughout the 1950s.
With Iran’s geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and its status as a Caspian Sea nation, Britain managed to convince the Eisenhower administration that Iran was particularly vulnerable to communist rhetoric and that the Tudeh Party of Iran would seek to promote an Iranian communist state. Britain’s success in persuading the U.S. in its campaign to oust Mossadegh represented a critical juncture in the overall scheme to restore Western control of Iranian oil.
Under the newly created CIA, the U.S. devised ‘Operation Ajax’ – the CIA’s first ever plot to remove a foreign leader – so as to oust Iran’s democratically elected Mossadegh in a meticulous coup d’état. Engaging in a mass propaganda campaign headed by Kermit Roosevelt, Jr (grandson of Theodore Roosevelt), the U.S. sought to disseminate information within Iran suggesting that Mossadegh’s nationalist ideology was in fact ‘communist’, and a threat to Iranian identity. In actual fact, Mossadegh was neither capitalist nor communist. As the first Iranian to receive his law degree abroad, Mossadegh was an advocate of secular democracy founded on the rule of law.
Without any legal basis or legitimacy, and contrary to popular opinion within Iran, the CIA was able to persuade the undemocratic and unelected Shah to charge Mossadegh with treason for his nationalistic efforts.
Propaganda Success
Declassified CIA documents have since revealed that by 1953, the CIA controlled approximately 80 per cent of the major newspapers within Tehran alone. Additionally, the U.S. bribed poorer sections of Iranian society to carry out fake protests, and to form street gangs in support of the Shah – and against Mossadegh – so as to create an illusory sense of undivided opposition to oil nationalisation.
Religious sectors of Iranian society were also bribed in an attempt to form some sort of ‘legitimate alliance’ against Mossadegh. At the hands of the U.S., violence on the streets continued to create an image of hostility towards Mossadegh. But in reality, Mossadegh remained immensely popular within Iran and initially resisted foreign attempts to remove him.
However, the mass propaganda campaign gained incredible momentum and culminated in the events of August 19, 1953, where deadly mass riots organised by the CIA impeached the ageing Mossadegh, eventually forcing him to surrender. Known by some as “the day Iran’s democracy died”, Mossadegh’s removal was declared legitimate by the Shah due to his culpability for the “most serious crimes”. Additional fake mass rallies were then conducted in support of the Shah’s return to his undemocratic and unpopular throne – and consequently, the restoration of Western oil contracts.
The exploitation of Iran’s oil under the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was revived under its new name British Petroleum, with Mossadegh successfully tried by a corrupt military tribunal and sentenced to both prison and house arrest until his death in 1967. Mossadegh maintained his innocence and his opposition to the alleged illegitimacy of his actions, plausibly insisting that his actions were taken to “nationalise the Iranian oil industry and remove from this land the network of colonialism and the political and economic influence of the greatest empire on earth”.
Whilst the Shah continued to rule Iran authoritatively for the next 26 years, Iranians were well aware that his restoration to the throne – and Mossadegh’s removal – was very much a product of Western complicity.
Lessons from the Past
This illegal coup – preceding the CIA’s incursion into Latin America – was first revealed to the general public through the declassification of CIA documents obtained by the New York Times in 2000. It was officially acknowledged by the Clinton administration in 2000 by Secretary of State Madeline Albright, who stated that knowledge of the coup made it “easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs”.
Yet the coup remains largely excluded from Western coverage of U.S.-Iranian relations. As such, the general public lacks a basic awareness of those events of 1953 which continue to cast a considerable shadow on the lack of diplomacy between the two countries. Such an important event is paramount to any understanding of current political relations between Iran and the West.
While the West has only recently officially acknowledged its complicity in the illegal coup of 1953, the events themselves have remained at the forefront of Iranian political thought and form the broader framework for sceptical relations with the West. For the astute political observer, the events of 1953 demonstrate the West’s responsibility for the construction of largely undemocratic regimes throughout the Middle East. While the West purports to support the establishment of ‘democracy’ throughout the world, these events serve as a timely reminder that the West arguably played a vital part in the establishment of the very regimes it now opposes and seeks to change.
As Kinzer suggests, the Shah would not have continued to rule his people with an iron fist had the 1953 coup not occurred. Tens of thousands of people would not have died at the hands of his secret police. As such, it may be plausible to argue that the Islamic Revolution would not have taken place. Perhaps the decline into greater authoritarianism may not have occurred under the Islamic Republic, and the disputed elections and crackdown of 2009 could have been avoided. Perhaps the U.S. and Iran would enjoy cordial relations founded on mutual respect and the rule of law. And perhaps Iran would have flourished under the secular democratic model Mossadegh envisaged for Iran.
Understanding the dynamics of the 1953 coup and Iran’s adverse reaction thereto suggests that the establishment of a democratic Iran may not have been as far-fetched as one might imagine, and may even remain a possibility today.
As such, Iran’s scepticism of the United States’ ‘democratic rhetoric’ appears justified, particularly when the foundations for democracy under Mossadegh were removed by the West in a meticulous campaign driven by of realist oil politics. Although the coup cannot be used as an excuse for continued violations of human rights within Iran, recognition of the coup provides greater understanding of the dynamics which pervade Iranian mistrust of the West.
Knowledge of the coup encourages the individual to reconsider the West’s complicity in the complex state of affairs which today define the Middle East. Caution should be exercised towards the West’s so-called overtures towards the Middle East, and its insistence on democracy. The world should not stand by and allow countries such as the U.S. and Britain to impose their agenda upon Iran and the broader Middle East without questioning their motives.
Rather, Mossadegh’s democratic legacy should be followed. The West’s incursion into the Middle East and third world countries must not remain unchallenged; for possessed of the historical lessons of the past, to “sit silently” would be – as Mossadegh famously suggested – to commit the ultimate sin.
Jahan Navidi is in his penultimate year of a combined Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of International and Global Studies.
