Rationality and Liberation
Melanie Brown explores the geopolitical imperatives of transforming China-Tibet relations
“There are no political gods. No genuine friendships in politics. Only self-interest. The world of politics is strewn with men of short memories and valiant tongues.”
Spoken by Pawa Trinley Tenzin, a dying Tibetan man who was to spend his last days in exile in Dharamsala, India.
Utopians fantasise that, since the Cold War, the world has risen above power politics, and that collective interest may finally prevail. However, the United States’ unilateral approach to world politics, particularly in the Middle East, demonstrates that this is not the case. So while appealing to philanthropic notions of human rights is incredibly tempting, when faced with the Chinese Government’s treatment of Tibet, they are of rather little value.
It is far more constructive to observe that it is, in fact, in the national interest of China to bring its policies more in line with modern democratic notions of human rights and self-determination, by granting Tibet a level of autonomy, for example. This may seem counterintuitive: if states are said to pursue self-interest and Tibetan autonomy is in Chinese interests, why has autonomy not already been granted? The answer lies in the exceptional domestic governance of China. National interests are determined by a tiny cohort of elites at the head of the Communist Party, with little reference to the attitude of the hapless masses. This simply would not be possible except under Chinese quasi-totalitarian autocracy. This is an anomaly in a realist world: China’s policy does not accurately reflect the national interest of the state.
With regard to the Tibet issue, China sits in a supreme bargaining position. Long ago, the Dalai Lama sacrificed independence as a goal and now merely seeks a level of autonomy and respect for human rights. China need not sacrifice a great deal of control over the treasure trove of Tibet to come to an agreement that would alleviate international pressure and condemnation. Its primary interests in Tibet lie in the exploitation of natural resources (chiefly water, uranium and other minerals), the use of Tibet’s altitude and proximity to India to secure its defence interests in the region, and the use of the large and relatively empty geographical expanse to help alleviate the overpopulation of China. Given the Tibetans’ lack of bargaining power in these situations, conceding a degree of autonomy is unlikely to affect these interests.
Furthermore, if China’s stance does not change, a confrontation between it and the democratised world seems inevitable. The Chinese Government’s treatment of its minorities, particularly Tibetans and the Uighur people of former East Turkistan, clearly infringes upon the human rights rhetoric that now permeates both domestic and international politics in most of the world. Moreover, by being situated on the ‘roof of the world’, Tibet is the world’s most valuable water source. It is the source of seven of Asia’s greatest rivers, which provide water for two billion people. The control of Tibet’s water allows China a powerful geopolitical lever over Asia: a frightening prospect to many.
By adding to the threat perceived by the West, the aggressiveness of China’s domestic and foreign policies has further contravened its own interests. For the first time in modern history, the world is faced with the prospect of the hegemony of a non-democratic power. China’s crackdowns on intellectual dissent and its censorship – both of material accessible by its own population, and of information allowed to escape to the outside world – are seen as an unacceptable restriction on freedom of speech. This is evinced in such recent events as Google’s withdrawal from the biggest Internet market in the world, and the sentencing of the rights activist Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in jail for drafting a manifesto for constitutional and democratic government.
In failing to act in accordance with modern human rights standards, China plays a dangerous game. The present Government seems perfectly willing to antagonise its neighbours on a whim, with little regard for its own alienation. The expansionist policies that drove it to invade Tibet and East Turkistan have shown little signs of halting. China now claims the historically Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh as part of China, due to its large Tibetan population. Recently, a Chinese map also depicted the Indian province of Kashmir as an independent country. The risk of conflict between these two emerging powers has risen dramatically since Tibet was annexed and the geographical separation of the two states came to an end. China has India geopolitically surrounded, with strategically placed naval bases and a newly solidified relationship with Nepal.
Currently, China is buying the compliance of the West. It relies on the great economic influence that it holds over the world, with very few states able to afford to upset their chief trading partner. However, this will not last. In the 1960s, the U.S. is alleged to have directed covert CIA operations that assisted the Tibetan independence movement, in an effort to counter Chinese communism. Many Chinese news sources continue to allege that Western support lies behind Tibetan resistance movements, including the 2008 riots. The Chinese Government has cause to worry: whilst the perceived threat of communism may have diminished, the U.S. certainly retains an interest in containing China. As China’s provocation continues and causes political anxiety to take the place of economic avarice, the West may soon begin to place its long-term security interests before short-term economic vitality.
The costs to China of preventing such a reaction are negligible when compared to the detrimental effects of confrontation or hostility. The Chinese economy is highly sustained by exports and, to a large extent, is also dependent on amicable relations with its trading partners. It is also still at a sufficiently early stage in economic development where a war, or even an embargo, could be crippling.
The Chinese Government has the unique ability to effect change rapidly and decisively. This is the virtue of autocratic governance: a policy need not be politically popular for it to be invoked in the pursuit of self-interest. In fact, at the moment, what is more important for China’s national interest is the international popularity of its policies. The liberal human rights discourse of the democratic world has caused China’s interests to converge somewhat with collective interests. The two are not mutually exclusive, as is so often assumed; one merely has to look to China’s recent, purely self-serving carbon emission cuts to observe this. Selfish intentions do not equate to negative outcomes, and the most productive way to encourage China to cooperate is to frame it in its own national interest, and ensure that the costs of non-compliance outweigh the benefits. Failure to acknowledge this could have dire ramifications for that quintessential goal of the liberal tradition: world peace.
